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INTRODUCTION 
This working document is published in parallel with the Report from the Commission to 
the Council and to the European Parliament on the implementation of macro-financial 
assistance (MFA) to third countries in 2009. It provides economic and financial 
information regarding the situation of the beneficiary countries as well as more detailed 
information on the implementation of MFA operations in those countries.  Statistical data 
on the different macro-financial assistance decisions adopted since 1990, by date and by 
regions, are included in the annex.  
 
WESTERN BALKANS 
1. BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA 
1.1.  Executive summary 
Bosnia and Herzegovina entered into a recession in 2009, with real GDP estimated to 
have declined by 3.2%, mainly due to a drop in private domestic consumption, 
investment and a contraction of external demand. The trade deficit fell by 28%, resulting 
in a halving of the current account deficit. Driven by international price developments, in 
particular in transport, energy and food, a slight deflation of 0.4% was recorded. Fiscal 
policy came increasingly under pressure in early 2009 due to falling revenues and high 
spending commitments. A three-year Stand-By Arrangement for Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was approved by the IMF Board on 8 July 2009, resulting in several revisions of the 
budget. Nevertheless, the consolidated budget deficit in 2009 is estimated at above 5% of 
GDP. A mild recovery is expected for 2010. 
In order to complement IMF and World Bank support, the Council of the European 
Union adopted a decision to make available to Bosnia and Herzegovina MFA in the form 
of a loan facility of up to EUR 100 million on 30 November 2009 (Decision 
2009/891/EC). The objective of this assistance is to help the authorities address residual 
external financing and budgetary needs that emerged as a consequence of the strong 
economic slowdown affecting the country. The disbursement is planned in two tranches, 
tentatively in the third and fourth quarter 2010, subject to satisfactory compliance with 
conditionality requirements.  
1.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Before the crisis, Bosnia and Herzegovina's growth model was characterised by high 
domestic demand, fed by rapid credit growth, external financing and expansionary fiscal 
policies that fuelled macroeconomic imbalances, not least a widening current account 
deficit. The global economic and financial crisis started to reveal its impact on Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in the last quarter 2008. Trade dynamics slowed drastically and 
unemployment picked up. The slowdown of economic activity continued in 2009 and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina fell into a recession with growth estimated at -3.2% in 2009 
after +5.3% in 2008. The economic downturn was mainly caused by a drop in private 
domestic consumption, investments and a contraction of external demand. As regards the  
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industrial sector, manufacturing (-4.6%
1) and mining (-2.8%) were the most affected in 
2009, while the energy sector remained relatively robust (+0.1%). Within the processing 
industry, the highest annual production drops were registered in metal (-17.2%), 
machinery (-22.3%) and wood (-16%) products which are all highly dependent on 
external demand. Overall, industrial production in Bosnia and Herzegovina decreased by 
3.3% in 2009.  
The effect of the crisis on the labour market could be felt throughout 2009 but 
particularly in the first half of the year. Overall, the traditionally very high rate of 
registered unemployment increased from 40.6% in December 2009 to 42.7% a year later. 
Job losses were concentrated in the private sector while the number of employees in the 
public sector increased by 2.9% year-on-year in December 2009. The sectors most 
affected by rising unemployment were the processing industry and construction. 
The decline in trade recorded in the first three quarters of 2009 decelerated in the fourth 
quarter, to some extent due to a base effect as trade had fallen drastically in the fourth 
quarter 2008. Imports of goods fell by 18.1% year-on-year (compared to a 27.6% 
decrease in the third quarter) and exports by 5.1% (17.3% in the third quarter), resulting 
in an improvement of the trade deficit by 27.4%. This led to a remarkable improvement 
of the current account which posted an estimated deficit of 7.5% of GDP in 2009 after 
14.9% of GDP in 2008. Falling surpluses in the services, income and current transfers 
balances did not offset this development.  
Foreign direct investments halved in 2009, reaching only an estimated 2.5% of GDP. 
While this appears to be mainly a result of the global economic crisis and worsened 
investors' sentiment, the lack of reform efforts, the standstill in privatisation and the 
unstable fiscal situation may have also contributed. Official foreign exchange reserves 
fell by 2.8% in the first two months of 2010 compared to their end-2009 level. However, 
they still cover around six months of imports. 
Annual inflation became negative in May 2009, down from its peak of nearly 10% a year 
earlier. The disinflationary trend was mainly driven by developments in transport, energy 
and food prices. The downward pressure on prices came to a halt in December 2009 
when prices were unchanged compared to the December 2008 level, and was reversed in 
early 2010. Overall, in 2009 the average price level decreased by 0.4% compared to 
2008.  
The short-term fiscal measures agreed with the IMF in May 2009 amounted to 0.7% of 
GDP on the revenue side and 2.5% of GDP on the expenditure side, relieving the 
pressure on the budgets. Both the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
Republika Srpska revised their budgets several times during the course of 2009 (three 
times in the Federation and twice in the Republika Srpska). However, these measures 
were unevenly implemented and revenues collected turned out to be lower than foreseen 
so that the envisaged deficit target (-4.7% of GDP, already revised downwards from the 
initial 4.4%) could not be reached. Indirect taxes revenues showed a severe negative 
trend in 2009. During the first three quarters of the year they decreased by 12% annually, 
mainly caused by a fall in customs revenues due to the strong decline of imports, import 
                                                 
1  This figure is, however, somewhat blurred by the effects of the reopening of an oil refinery in December 
2008which drove the annual growth rate in the subsection  of coke and refined products to 499% (!) in 
2009.  
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prices and the reduction of tariffs following the entry into force of the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement with the EU in mid-2008. Preliminary data indicate that, on 
account of revenue shortfalls and despite lower than-programmed expenditures, the 2009 
general government deficit reached 5.3% of GDP. Overruns on wages and transfers were 
offset by strict control over other current spending and by underperformance of the 
capital budget.  
1.3.  Structural reforms 
The commitment to pursue structural reforms remained weak, particularly in the 
Federation, but gained momentum in the context of the financial support facilities agreed 
with the international community, which linked its support to certain reforms, especially 
in the area of social transfers. The legislation agreed with the World Bank (and adopted 
in February 2010) to reform the system of social benefits to privileged groups in the 
Federation was necessary in order to curb down social benefit expenditures to a 
sustainable level.  
The privatisation process in both entities continued to proceed very slowly, being 
however much more advanced in the Republika Srpska. Bosnia and Herzegovina has 
undertaken some limited reforms in order to improve the business environment. 
Obtaining a construction permit was simplified by facilitating the registration of new 
buildings in the land and property registries, reducing from 296 to 255 days the average 
time needed to obtain a permit. Transferring property also became more efficient thanks 
to the computerisation of the land registry. Despite some improvements in court 
registration, the average time to start a business remained at 60 days. A new Law on 
Business Companies came into effect in the Republika Srpska on 1 July 2009, 
simplifying the business start-up process, whereby certain inspections are now conducted 
after the business has started its operations. Concerning the closure of businesses, 
professional requirements for trustees were tightened, reducing the time needed in 
bankruptcy procedures. The "Legislative Guillotine" project to reduce administrative 
burdens has been completed in the Republika Srpska. In the Federation, it was launched 
in mid-2009. Businesses continue to suffer from political instability, a high tax burden, 
and slow contract enforcement and business registration procedures. These factors, as 
well as the poor quality of public services, negatively affects the business climate and the 
attractiveness of Bosnia and Herzegovina for investors.  
Even though the country managed to climb three places in the latest World Bank's Doing 
Business Report to 116
th in the world (out of 183 countries), it still lags behind its 
neighbours, reflecting lengthy procedures for paying taxes and in registering property. In 
the Global Competitiveness Report of the World Economic Forum, Bosnia and 
Herzegovina slides two positions to 109
th place among 133 countries. Government and 
policy instability, as well as inefficient administration and tax rates, are named as the 
most problematic factors for doing business in the country. 
1.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
Faced with a deteriorating economic environment and the legacy of poor fiscal policies, 
public finances increasingly came under stress in early 2009 as a result of falling 
revenues and high spending commitments. Refinancing of the current account deficit and 
of the external debt roll-over also became more uncertain under unfavourable financial 
markets developments. The authorities of all government levels concluded in early May 
2009 negotiations with the IMF on a Stand-By Arrangement that comprised  
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commitments to a number of structural reforms and fiscal adjustment measures. The 
Fund's Board approved a EUR 1.15 billion loan (13% of GDP; 600% of the quota) for a 
three-year period on 8 July 2009. The first instalment of about EUR 203 million was 
disbursed in July. The estimated total financing gap under the programme amounts to 
some EUR 1.5 billion.  
The main policy condition under the programme is a reduction of current expenditure, 
especially wages and social transfers. The programme seeks to: (a) reduce the structural 
fiscal balance so as to limit the government’s financing needs and bring public finances 
to a sustainable medium-term path; (b) re-establish public wage policy restraint; (c) 
support adequate liquidity and capitalisation of banks; and (d) secure enough external 
financing and improve confidence. The first IMF review mission was conducted in 
November 2009 but formal approval of the review was delayed. Only after the reform of 
untargeted social benefits in the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina had been 
approved in Parliament in late February 2010, the conditions for the conclusion of the 
first programme review were deemed fulfilled. The IMF Board approved the review on 
25 March 2010, which resulted in the release of the second and third tranche of the 
Stand-By Arrangement in the amount of approximately EUR 110 million and EUR 30 
million, respectively. Like the first disbursement, they were channelled to the budgets of 
the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (60%) and the Republika Srpska (40%).  
Under the IMF programme's assumptions, the strong fiscal adjustment will reduce the 
budget's financing needs in 2010. However, those needs still amount to an estimated 
2.3% of GDP (almost EUR 300 million), before international support. With the current 
account continuing to adjust and debt roll-over rates and FDI improving due to enhanced 
confidence in economic policies and the projected recovery in the world economy, gross 
financing needs during 2011 and the first half of 2012 are projected to decline 
substantially. The total external financing gap under the programme would amount to 
EUR 1,488 million. The IMF will provide about EUR 1,145 million (600% of quota) 
during the programme period, while the World Bank has indicated commitments of EUR 
189 million. The EU's macro-financial assistance would contribute to filling the 
remainder of the external financial gap in 2010, complementing IMF and World Bank 
support.  
On 22 May 2009, the State Minister of Finance of Bosnia and Herzegovina addressed a 
letter to the European Commission, requesting MFA in the amount of EUR 100 million. 
The Commission subsequently proposed on 29 October 2009 MFA to Bosnia and 
Herzegovina in the form of a loan facility of up to EUR 100 million and the Parliament 
voted favourably on 24 November. On 30 November 2009, the Council adopted the 
decision (Decision 2009/891/EC; published in the Official Journal of the European 
Union, L 320, 05.12.2009, p. 6-8.).  
In order to update the Operational Assessment carried out in 2004, the Commission 
assigned PriceWaterhouseCoopers to conduct a new Operational Assessment of 
administrative procedures and financial circuits of public organisations involved in the 
management of MFA in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The assessment was carried out by the 
consultants in November 2009. Their general opinion is that the framework for a sound 
financial management is effective, especially in Republika Srpska and, to a lesser level, 
at State level, although with the need for further strengthening and completion of the 
reforms. On the other hand, significant gaps have been noted in the Federation of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina.  
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The disbursement will be conditional upon a satisfactory track record in the 
implementation of the current Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF, as well as upon a 
positive evaluation by the European Commission of progress made with respect to a 
number of structural reforms. The disbursement is planned in two tranches, tentatively in 
the third and fourth quarter 2010. 
In addition, the World Bank plans to negotiate three successive DPL which are meant to 
be disbursed in 2010, 2011 and 2012. Negotiations for the first DPL were concluded in 
March 2010. This DPL1 was approved by the World Bank Board on 8 April 2010. It 
amounts to about EUR 155 million, which are supposed to be transferred to the budgets 
of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (60%) and the Republika Srpska (40%).  
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BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA -  SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1.  Price liberalisation  
Regulated prices largely prevail for some utilities and infrastructure as well as in some 
other areas.  
2.  Trade liberalisation  
Bosnia and Herzegovina started WTO accession negotiations in 1999. In July 2008, the 
Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the EU was signed and the Interim 
Agreement entered into force. 
3.  Exchange rate regime  
In 1997, the Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina established a currency board with the 
Deutsche Mark as the anchor currency, which has functioned smoothly since then. With the 
introduction of the euro the Bosnian Convertible Mark was pegged at 1.95583 to the euro 
and has remained unchanged since then.  
4.  Foreign direct investment  
FDI inflows reached a peak in 2007 when the telecommunications company of the 
Republika Srpska was privatised, stabilised in 2008 and then halved in 2009, falling to 
around 2.5% of GDP. FDI has been mainly related to privatisation transactions, as green-
field investment is still hampered by weaknesses in the business environment.  
5.  Monetary policy  
The Central Bank of Bosnia and Herzegovina is responsible for operating the currency 
board arrangement, which limits the scope of monetary policy basically to minimum 
reserve requirement ratios.  
6.  Public finances  
The additional fiscal space created by the introduction of VAT in 2006 was not used to 
consolidate public finances but rather spilled into unproductive spending on social transfers 
and the public sector wage bill. The high share of public spending to GDP remained at 
around 45%. When the economic crisis unfolded in the country, public finances came 
increasingly under pressure so that the authorities had to resort to several budget 
rebalancing exercises in 2009, and to international support. A new IMF Stand-By 
Arrangement programme was agreed in July 2009. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring  
The government of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina requested the privatisation 
agency to develop a revised action plan for 2009-10, including the privatisation of the 
entire public share in eight companies. However, the main public enterprises in the 
Federation, including the two telecom operators, are not covered, and progress on the plan 
is very slow. In Republika Srpska, around 69% of the initial stock of State – owned 
enterprises capital intended for privatisation had been sold by May 2010. 
8.  Financial sector reform  
Despite the repercussions of the global financial crisis on Bosnia and Herzegovina, the 
financial sector remained sound and well-capitalised and its liquidity position was not 
seriously undermined. However, financial intermediation is still relatively shallow. 
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2. KOSOVO (UNSCR 1244) 
2.1.  Executive summary 
Despite the global economic crisis, Kosovo's GDP is estimated to have grown by 4.0% in 
2009. However, the general picture is that Kosovo lags behind its neighbours in terms of 
per capita income and its level of growth is too sluggish in order to meet the substantial 
development needs. In 2009, Kosovo became a member of the IMF and the World Bank. 
In November 2006, the Council had decided to make available to Kosovo exceptional 
Community financial assistance in the form of budget support grants of up to 
EUR  50  million (Council Decision 2006/880/EC). However, the assistance was not 
disbursed as a number of key conditions, in particular an understanding with the IMF as 
well as the confirmation of budgetary financing needs, were not met. The availability of 
exceptional Community financial assistance to Kosovo was to expire two years after the 
signing of the Memorandum of Understanding laying down the conditions for the release 
of the assistance, i.e. on 11 December 2009. The European Commission adopted on 
7 December 2009 a Decision (2009/918/EU) to extend the availability period of the EU 
exceptional financial assistance to Kosovo by one additional year, until 
11 December 2010.  
2.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Despite the global economic crisis, Kosovo's economy is estimated to have grown by 
4.1% in 2009. Public investment and private consumption were the main contributors to 
growth. Kosovo's limited integration into global markets and its sound but 
underdeveloped financial sector have limited the impact of the international crisis so far. 
The use of the euro as legal tender sheltered Kosovo from currency depreciation and 
contributed positively to the overall financial stability. An expenditure-driven fiscal 
expansion however worsened substantially Kosovo's fiscal position. 
A weak external demand and continuously robust domestic demand resulted in almost 
unchanged foreign trade deficit of about 45.9% of GDP in 2009 compared to 45.6% of 
GDP in 2008. Overall, the value of exports of goods decreased by 18.1% in 2009 and 
imports of goods recorded a marginal decline of 1.5%. As a consequence of trade 
developments, the coverage ratio of exports as a percentage of imports (12-month 
moving average) has decreased since December 2008 (10.3%) and stood at 8.2% a year 
later, while the trade deficit increased. The European Union and the countries of CEFTA 
remain the main trading partners of Kosovo. 
The monetary framework is anchored on the use of the euro as legal tender. The Central 
Bank of Kosovo, therefore, cannot implement an independent monetary or exchange rate 
policy.  Its role lies in supervising the financial sector and monitoring liquidity in the 
banking sector and credit expansion, with liquidity ratios and reserve requirements as 
main policy tools. The banking system consists of eight banks which mainly engage in 
domestic deposit-taking and lending. The sector showed little signs of distress in 2009 
and financial intermediation progressed, albeit at a lower pace compared to 2008. At the 
end of 2009, annual deposit growth stood at 20.8% and credit growth at 8.9%. The loans-
to-deposit ratio decreased to 73.9%, well below the informal benchmark according to 
which this ratio should not exceed 80%. Banks' annual profits decreased by 30% and 
reached EUR 25.3 million by the end of 2009.  
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Throughout most of the year 2009, the twelve-month CPI inflation rates were negative, 
driven mainly by falling food and energy prices. Only in December 2009 did inflation 
turned again positive at 0.1%. Since then, it slightly accelerated and reached 1.1% in 
February 2010 when the goods and services with positive contribution to inflation had a 
total weight of close to 51% in the whole CPI basket. Average annual inflation in 2009 
stood at -2.4%, after 9.4% in 2008 and 4.4% in 2007. 
The Kosovo authorities estimate that workers remittances declined by about 8% in 2009 
to EUR 356 million. Migrant remittances constitute a major source of income for 
Kosovo, which is channelled predominantly into current consumption and contributes to 
alleviating poverty. At the same time, remittances significantly influence labour market 
outcomes by decreasing participation rates and increasing the reservation wage for those 
receiving them. 
Labour Force Survey data show that almost all basic labour market indicators worsened 
in 2008. The labour force, as a percent of the working age population, dropped from 
46.8% in 2007 to 46.2% in 2008. The employment rate was only 24.3%, far from its peak 
of 29.0% in 2006. The sector of trade provided most of the jobs in 2008 (17.1%), 
followed by education (13.6%), administration (9.7%), production (8.7%), and 
construction (8.6%). The unemployment rate stood at 47.5% in 2008, marking a 
significant increase from the 2007 level of 43.6%. Most of the unemployment is long-
term, pointing to very low dynamics in the labour market, even though a significant 
informal sector distorts the actual picture. 
Budgetary developments in Kosovo have been quite volatile and hard to predict in recent 
years, turning from a high surplus in 2007 to a high deficit in 2009. According to 
preliminary data from the ministry of economy and finance the general government 
posted a deficit of 1.1% of GDP in 2009. The underlying deficit is much higher 
amounting to about 6.4% of GDP, if a one-off EUR 200 million dividend payment 
received from the incumbent telecom company (PTK) is taken into account. The 
underlying nominal growth in total revenue (corrected for the one-off revenue) was 
slightly positive at 0.5%. Tax revenue increased by 1.4%, while non-tax revenue 
(excluding the PTK dividend) underperformed and declined by 5.1%. 
Total expenditure increased substantially (by 17.8%) in nominal terms in 2009. Spending 
on wages and salaries was up by 16.4%, subsidies and transfers increased by 22.5% from 
an already high base in 2008, spending on goods and services was up by 9.0%, and 
capital outlays rose by 15.4%. The current expenditure growth pattern continued in early 
2010 as well. Despite the positive balance after the first two months of the year, the 
budget is facing growing risks as tax revenue performance remains moderate and 
pressures on the expenditure side are rising. 
2.3.  Structural reforms 
There have been almost no changes in the enterprise structure in 2009, which remains 
dominated by micro-enterprises. The number of registered enterprises increased across 
all municipalities and rose in total by 9.5% to 74,436, with 45% of them working in the 
sector of trade and repair. By the end of 2009, enterprises employing 5 and more people 
represented only 5.6% of total and enterprises with foreign capital ownership only 0.5% 
of all enterprises in Kosovo.  
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The restructuring of publicly-owned enterprises remains one of the main policy 
challenges. Infrastructure is still insufficient and often of poor quality. The energy sector 
is crucial for Kosovo's economic development and the low reliability of energy supply 
continues to be a major obstacle impeding business activity in Kosovo. Despite some 
improvements in billing and collection, commercial and technical losses are estimated at 
about 51% of all energy flows entering into the system operated by the Kosovo Energy 
Corporation. In order to boost the performance of the company, the authorities 
announced plans to privatise its supply and distribution functions. In line with the Energy 
Strategy for 2009-2018, a construction of a new coal-fired power plant with a capacity of 
at least 1,000 MW is envisaged as well. 
In March 2010, the government awarded to a Turkish-American joint venture a contract 
for building the Vermica–Merdare motorway, enhancing the country's transport links 
with Albania. The government intends to give high priority to the estimated 
EUR 700 million (about 20% of GDP) project, expected to be completed in three to four 
years. This project constitutes a deviation from the initial 2010 budget and will adversely 
affect fiscal performance. 
Overall, institutional capacity remains weak and little progress has been made with the 
establishment of clear property rights. 
2.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In November 2006, the Council decided to make available to Kosovo exceptional 
financial assistance in the form of budget support grants of up to EUR 50 million 
(Council Decision 2006/880/EC). This assistance was made available with a view to 
alleviating the financial situation in Kosovo, supporting the development of a sound 
economic and fiscal framework, facilitating the continuation and strengthening of 
essential administrative functions, and addressing public investment needs. In December 
2007, a Memorandum of Understanding laying down the conditions for the release of the 
assistance was signed between the European Commission and the Kosovo authorities. 
However, the assistance was not disbursed as key conditions, in particular an 
understanding with the IMF as well as the confirmation of budgetary financing needs, 
were not met. 
An operational assessment has been carried out in October 2008 by the Commission 
services with the assistance of PricewaterhouseCoopers. The conclusion of the report 
was that "the framework for a sound financial management is effective" despite 
weaknesses detected at the level of the internal control within the budgetary process.  
The availability of the exceptional Community financial assistance to Kosovo was to 
expire two years after the signing of the Memorandum of Understanding laying down the 
conditions for the release of the assistance, i.e. on 11 December 2009. Nevertheless, the 
Council Decision foresaw the possibility for the Commission, after consultation of the 
EFC, to extend the availability period by a maximum of one additional year. 
Among the preconditions for such an extension were clear prospects of an understanding 
or agreement between the Kosovar authorities and the IMF as well as confirmation of 
budgetary financing needs in 2010. To evaluate whether these conditions could be met in 
2010, the Commission requested an official IMF assessment letter.  
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Based on the results of their mission to Kosovo in late October 2009, on 13 November 
2009 the IMF issued an assessment letter confirming that these conditions could be met 
in 2010. Thus, the IMF assessment supported the case for the extension of the 
availability period of this assistance by one additional year, until 11 December 2010. 
Therefore, after duly consulting the Economic and Financial Committee and with no 
objections to the proposed action, on 7 December 2009 the European Commission 
adopted a Decision (2009/918/EU) to extend the availability period of exceptional 
Community financial assistance to Kosovo by one additional year, until 11 December 
2010. In a follow-up step, Addenda to the Memorandum of Understanding and to the 
Grant Agreement have been signed by the Kosovo authorities and the Commission. 
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KOSOVO - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
1.  Price liberalisation 
The price setting mechanism is basically free. Current governance arrangements as regards 
publicly-owned enterprises ensure the absence of government interference in the price setting 
mechanism of their services. 
2.  Trade liberalisation 
Regional trade integration and liberalisation continued to face some obstacles in 2009. Serbia is 
still blocking the exports from Kosovo and Bosnia and Herzegovina is refusing preferential 
treatment. Efforts to resolve this trade dispute are ongoing. 
3.  Exchange rate regime 
Kosovo continued to use the euro as sole legal tender.  The Central Bank of Kosovo is in charge of 
regulating foreign exchange operations, providing payments services and supervising banks and 
other financial institutions. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
Net FDI inflows are estimated to have reached EUR 271 million (7.2% of GDP) in 2009, down 
from EUR 341 million (9.0% of GDP) in 2008. 
5.  Monetary policy 
The monetary framework remained anchored on the use of the euro as sole legal tender (see also 
section 3 above).  
6.  Public finance 
The execution of the budget in 2009 was characterised by a stable revenue performance and a 
substantial increase in both, current and capital spending.  Preliminary data point to an annual 
2009 budget deficit of 1.2% of GDP in 2009. The budget is facing growing pressure as tax revenue 
performance remains moderate and expenditure continues to rise. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The privatisation of socially-owned enterprises continues under the auspices of the Privatisation 
Agency of Kosovo. The restructuring of publicly-owned enterprises remains one of the main 
structural policy challenges. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
The banking sector has shown little signs of distress in 2009 and financial intermediation 
progressed, albeit at a lower pace compared to 2008. By the end of 2009, the loans to deposit ratio 
decreased to 73.9%, pointing to a conservative banking model. Although banks' profits decreased 
by 30% in 2009, the banking system remains profitable and well capitalised. 
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3. SERBIA 
3.1.  Executive summary 
GDP contracted by 3% in real terms in 2009 as domestic demand waned against the 
backdrop of the global economic crisis. The balance of payments position somewhat 
improved as it benefitted from the narrowing of the current account deficit, as well as 
from IMF funding and an agreement with foreign parent banks. The fiscal slippage was 
broadly contained as the authorities implemented a number of economic policy measures 
announced under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement. The latter, approved in January 2009, 
was originally designed as precautionary assistance for EUR 420 million over 15 months 
and in May converted into a full-fledged disbursing programme of almost EUR 3 billion 
for the period 2009–2011. 
On 30 November 2009, the Council of the European Union adopted a decision to make 
available to Serbia MFA in the form of a loan facility of up to EUR 200 million. The 
objective of this assistance is to help the government address residual external financing 
and budgetary needs that emerged as a consequence of the strong economic slowdown. 
This assistance from the European Union is complementary to the resources provided by 
International Financial Institutions and bilateral donors. Moreover, the Commission was 
able to disburse EUR 50 million (out of a total 100 million) of budget support under the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession. 
By the end of 2009, Serbia made some progress in its path towards the EU integration. 
The confirmation of a satisfactory cooperation with the International Criminal Tribunal 
for the former Yugoslavia paved the way to the unblocking of the Interim Agreement and 
visa liberalisation. On 22 December, Serbia formally applied for EU membership.  
3.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
Severely strained by the impact of the global recession since the second half of 2008, 
Serbia’s economy shrunk by 3% in real terms in 2009. Following a 4.1% year-on-year 
fall in the first half of the year, the decline of GDP started to ease in the third quarter  
(-2.3% year-on-year) and the fourth quarter of 2009 (-1.6% year-on-year).  Economic 
growth turned negative as domestic demand, which was the driving force of the economy 
over the past years, faltered, with investment estimated by the authorities to have fallen 
by more than 20% and private consumption by over 5%. The sectors most heavily 
affected by the crisis were construction (-17.1%) and manufacturing (-15.3%). Modest 
growth was recorded in transport (7.2%) and financial intermediation (5.1%). 
Trade was significantly affected but as imports fell faster than exports, the traditionally 
large current deficit narrowed more than expected, down to 5.7% of GDP from 17.1% of 
GDP in 2008. Nevertheless, the merchandise trade deficit, which worsened towards the 
end of the year remained relatively high at slightly over 15% of GDP (down from above 
20% in 2008). The reduction in the current account deficit was also partly due to a record 
inflow of remittances in 2009 of EUR 2.6 billion, i.e. around 8% of GDP. At the end of 
2009, capital inflows also started to pick up but remained for the year as a whole 
considerably lower than in 2008. Foreign direct investment dropped by almost 25%. The 
additional SDR holdings extended under the IMF Stand-By Arrangement programme 
boosted reserve assets of the central bank in 2009, following a fall in foreign currency 
reserves a year earlier.  
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In the beginning of 2009 and, again, by the end of the year, the foreign exchange market 
came under significant pressure, leading to a 25% nominal depreciation of the dinar 
against the euro compared to mid-2008. Having stabilised the exchange rate through a 
tightening of the monetary policy in early 2009, the National Bank of Serbia reversed 
course during the year and provided liquidity notably through the lowering of the 
reference rate and administrative and regulatory measures. At the end of the year, it 
intervened again in the foreign exchange market. By end-2009, it had sold a total of 
EUR 567 million and slashed the interest rate by 825 bps, from 17.75% to 9.5%, in order 
to boost up liquidity and smooth the exchange rate depreciation. Credit activity to 
households and enterprises was sustained also owing to the European Bank Coordination 
Initiative
2, whereby foreign parent banks committed in March 2009 to maintain their 
exposure in Serbia at its 2008 level. 
The prime monetary policy concern, however, has remained price stability since the 
inflation rate has been relatively high compared to other countries in the region. After a 
hike in 2007 and early 2008, which propelled the average CPI inflation back to double 
digits at 12.4% for 2008, inflationary pressures eased somewhat during 2009 thanks to 
lower oil and food prices, in line with the general price developments in the global 
markets. By the end of 2009, CPI inflation declined to 6.6% year-on-year (8.6% in 2008) 
which was mainly due to lower aggregate demand while the pass-through of the 
exchange rate depreciation has been limited.  
Given the poor economic growth performance the labour market remained very weak. 
The Labour Force Survey conducted in October 2009 registered an increase in 
unemployment rate to 17.4% compared to 14.7% a year ago. In line with this trend, 
employment is estimated to have declined by 4.6%, resulting in a lower employment rate 
than in 2008 (50% vs. 53.3%). The nominal freeze of public sector wages contributed to 
an overall wage moderation for the year as a whole: net wages decreased in 2009 by 
3.7% year-on-year in real terms compared to an almost 5% rise in 2008.  
The general government deficit is estimated to have reached in 2009 4.2% of GDP, 
which is slightly below the deficit of 4.5%, of GDP foreseen in September under the 
Stand-By Arrangement programme. In line with the IMF conditions, the government 
implemented a number of fiscal expenditure measures capping current expenditures 
through a nominal freeze of public sector wages and pensions as well as restricting hiring 
in the public sector. In addition, there was across-the-board trimming of discretionary 
expenditure. Compared to 2008, the expenditure ratio is estimated to have declined by 
0.5 percentage points to 43% of GDP. The share of revenues as a percentage of GDP is 
also estimated to have dropped in 2009 by 2.4 percentage points compared to 2008, to 
38.7% of GDP. The difficult economic situation, which also involved extensive lay-offs 
in the private sector and salary freezes in the public sector, translated into a shortfall in 
personal income tax revenue. Furthermore, indirect taxation (customs revenues and 
VAT) plunged following the drop in domestic demand and imports. Conversely, excise 
taxes increased as a consequence of the rise in excise duties on diesel and gasoline. The 
budget financing gap in 2009 spurred government borrowing on the domestic financial 
                                                 
2   The European Bank Coordination or Vienna Initiative is a platform launched in early 2009 to address 
needs ensuing from the unfolding of the global crisis. It is co-ordinated by the IMF, the EBRD and the 
European Commission, together with a number of countries that agreed with the IMF programmes. The 
platform has facilitated (i) commitments by parent banks to finance the roll-over of external lending; and 
(ii) enhanced cooperation between supervisory agencies in home and host countries.  
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market as well as from international sources. By end-December, public debt reached 
EUR 9.85 billion (31.3% of GDP).  
3.3.  Structural reforms 
While important steps have been fallen to transform the economy over the past years 
there has been, however, a slowdown in reform efforts since the start of the crisis. 
Important challenges remain, especially related to the creation of a viable market 
economy and a business-friendly environment. Furthermore, high unemployment and a 
growing number of insolvencies
3 weigh on the economic performance. 
The sluggish privatisation of public enterprises has been the weakest aspect of the 
reforms in Serbia. The privatisation of socially-owned enterprises stalled during the 
recent recession due to unfavourable market conditions. Furthermore, the sale contracts 
have been repealed in some cases where the authorities concluded that the buyer was in 
breach of some or all of the standard requirements. While calls to review past 
privatisation cases have resurfaced on grounds of money laundering allegations, the 
official stance is that the process would be completed by the end of 2010, one year 
behind schedule. Likewise, the liberalisation of state-owned banks and infrastructure 
activities, such as the electricity, telecom, airport and pharmaceutical companies, is being 
delayed since the government has not yet reached an agreement on restructuring and 
privatisation strategies for most of the enterprises concerned. Similarly, no progress has 
been made as regards stepping up the processes of denationalisation and restitution. 
On the other hand, the authorities have initiated further steps in establishing legal 
predictability, and removing excessive administrative requirements and barriers. During 
2009, Serbia has launched reforms in a few key areas, including the judiciary. As regards 
the reform of governance and regulatory institutions, however, the process is slow 
compared to its transition peers. According to the latest Doing Business 2010 report by 
the World Bank, Serbia continues to lag behind the more advanced countries in most 
standards.  
The government's policy priority now is to advance structural reforms in the direction of 
developing industrial sectors in the high value-added part of the productive chain so as to 
bolster exports. An improved economic performance will further depend in the country’s 
ability to attract foreign investment and to deal with important structural rigidities in the 
labour market, reflected in the persistently high unemployment and a low participation 
rate, particularly among older workers.  
3.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In December 2008, against the backdrop of the international financial crisis and in 
response to the mounting economic problems under tighter external financing conditions, 
Serbia requested financial assistance from the IMF. An initial precautionary Stand-By 
Arrangement for EUR 420 million over 15 months was revised following a further 
deterioration of the economic situation in the first half of 2009. The programme was 
                                                 
3 Although the new law adopted in December 2009 was a welcome step towards speeding-up bankruptcy 
procedures, the efficiency of courts in dealing with these procedures remains an issue of concern.  
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converted into a disbursing one, and almost EUR 3 billion were made available for the 
period 2009–2011.  
Furthermore, in view of the fragile economic situation and outlook the World Bank 
approved in 2009 a package of Development Policy Instruments in the total amount of 
around EUR 0.5 billion, planned for disbursement over a three-year period. Additionally, 
the EU agreed to provide exceptional budget support of EUR 100 million under the 
Instrument for Pre-Accession (IPA) on a satisfactory fulfilment of the economic policy 
conditions. Following a positive assessment of the required conditions for IPA budget 
support by the Commission services, the first tranche of EUR 50 million was paid at the 
end of December 2009. 
After consulting the EFC, the Commission also proposed to make available to Serbia 
MFA in the form of a loan facility of up to EUR 200 million on 8 October 2009 and the 
Parliament voted favourably on 24 November. On 30 November 2009, the Council of the 
European Union adopted the related decision (Decision 2009/892/EC, OJ L 320, 
05.12.2009, p. 9-11). The objective of this assistance is to help the authorities address 
residual external financing and budgetary needs that emerged in the context of the 
unfolding of the global crisis in the country. It is meant to be complementary to the IMF 
and the World Bank programmes. 
As a prior step in designing the MFA, the Commission assigned PriceWaterhouse 
Coopers with conducting an update of the Operational Assessment of administrative 
procedures and financial circuits of organisations involved in the management of MFA 
which was carried out by the consultants in the spring of 2009. The general conclusion of 
the report is that the financial management framework is broadly sound and effective, 
despite certain weaknesses detected during the operational assessment. In particular, 
certain areas such as the internal and external audit function require urgent improvement.  
Compared to the situation assessed in 2004, real improvement was observed in different 
sectors such as the treasury administration, the accounting and debt management or the 
IT department. 
A Memorandum of Understanding detailing the economic policy conditions related to the 
disbursement of the assistance was negotiated with the authorities in March 2010. The 
assistance is to be made available in 2010, conditional upon a satisfactory track record in 
the implementation of the current Stand-By Arrangement with the IMF, as well as 
subject to fulfilment of conditionality requirements, to be evaluated by the Commission 
services. It is planned to be disbursed in two equal instalments of EUR 100 million each, 
tentatively in the third and the fourth quarter 2010.   
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SERBIA - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
1.  Price liberalisation 
The share of administered prices in the CPI has declined steadily to around 6% by 2009. The 
government regulates prices of state-owned utilities in the area of fuel, electricity, 
telecommunication, communal and other public services.  
2.  Trade liberalisation 
In December 2009, the EU unblocked the Interim Agreement, which Serbia had been 
implementing unilaterally since January 2009. This has paved the way for the start of the 
ratification process of the Stabilisation and Association Agreement signed in April 2008 by the EU 
Member States.  
3.  Exchange rate regime 
Serbia's exchange rate regime is a managed float of the dinar. The central bank intervens in the 
interbank market to avoid extreme exchange rate volatility and defend the dinar against 
depreciation in the core of the crisis. In 2009, it sold a total of EUR 657 million over a number of 
FOREX operations. 
4.  Foreign direct investment 
There are no controls on inward direct investment. Net FDI inflows are estimated to have reached 
almost EUR 1.4 billion (4.4% of GDP) in 2009, down from EUR just above 1.8 billion (5.5% of 
GDP) in 2008. 
5.  Monetary policy 
Since 2006, the National Bank of Serbia conducts monetary policy under a formal inflation 
targeting regime. In 2009, it abandoned core inflation as its target and started setting a broad target 
band around the headline CPI inflation rate. The main policy instrument in achieving the target has 
been the two-week repo interest rate. By end-December, it had been slashed by 825 bps to 9.5%, 
from 17.75% in the beginning of the year.  
6.  Public finance 
In 2009, the fiscal deficit increased from 2.5% to 4.2% of GDP. This budgetary outcome, 
however, was better than the 4.5% target set in September, reflecting the considerable revenue 
shortfall in the face of the crisis. In response, the government implemented a number of ad-hoc 
expenditure cuts, which helped to rein in current spending. A more long-run fiscal adjustment, 
however, will require full-fledged structural reforms, in particular in public administration and the 
pensions system. 
7.  Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
Privatisation of public enterprises remains the weakest point on the recent reform agenda. 
Privatisation of socially-owned enterprises stalled in 2009 due to the crisis while privatisation of 
state-owned companies is being delayed due to the lack of political consensus about restructuring 
and privatisation strategies. 
8.  Financial sector reform 
The banking sector regained stability after the crisis of confidence at the end of 2008 partly 
reflecting administrative and regulatory measures adopted by the authorities, as well as the 
commitments made by commercial banks under the Vienna Initiative
4. Throughout 2009, the 
banking system remained well capitalised and liquid and deemed resilient to further stress. 
                                                 
4  See footnote 2  
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EASTERN NEIGHBOURHOOD COUNTRIES 
4. ARMENIA 
4.1.  Executive summary 
The global economic downturn and particularly the rapid deterioration of the Russian 
economy had a deep impact on the Armenian economy in 2009. Economic activity, 
which had started to fall in the last quarter of 2008, contracted by around 14.4 % in 2009, 
representing a marked turnaround compared to the strong growth rates of previous years. 
A recovery above 3% is foreseen for 2010 although it is likely to be fragile and will 
depend on the developments of the Russian economy. 
Led by the steep economic slowdown, average inflation fell dramatically from 9% in 
2008 to 3.5% in 2009 while the fiscal deficit rose markedly to 7.8% of GDP in 2009 
from 1.2% of GDP in 2008. Similarly, public debt rose from 16% of GDP at the end of 
2008 to 39.8% of GDP in 2009 with the external component reaching 34 % of GDP. As 
the country will continue to rely on donors financing to cover its financing needs, public 
debt is expected to increase to 50.8 % of GDP in 2010, with the external component 
reaching 43 % of GDP. 
Armenia's external position deteriorated in 2009, despite the significant weakening of the 
Armenian dram and the deep recession that led to a contraction in imports. In the wake of 
a steep decline in exports and remittances, the current account deficit failed to adjust and 
widen to 13.8% of GDP in 2009 from 11.8% of GDP in 2008. 
At the outbreak of the crisis, the Armenian authorities acted rapidly, adopting appropriate 
measures to mitigate the effects of the sharp downfall in output. In March 2009, they 
reached an agreement with the IMF on a Stand-By Arrangement totalling about 
USD 810 million, while securing additional funding from other multilateral and bilateral 
donors (including a USD 500 million loan from Russia) to meet the increasing fiscal and 
external financing needs. The EU Council of Ministers also decided, in November 2009, 
to provide MFA to Armenia amounting to EUR  100 million, part of which 
(EUR 35 million) will be in grants. 
Performance under the Stand-By Arrangement has been strong. Upon Armenia's request, 
the IMF Executive Board approved, on 28 June 2010, a new programme, under the 
Extended Fund Facility and the concessional Extended Credit Facility. Under the new 
programme, which replaced the Stand-By Arrangement, Armenia will have access to 
about USD 392 million (290% of quota) in a three year period. Armenia's access to the 
Fund's concessional lending window should help alleviate its future debt reayment needs. 
4.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The global economic downturn and particularly the rapid deterioration of the Russian 
economy had a deep impact on the Armenian economy in 2009. Economic activity, 
which had started to fall since the last quarter of 2008, contracted by around 14.4 % in 
2009, representing a marked turnaround compared to the strong growth rates of previous 
years. This reflected the slump in the construction sector, which shrank by around 38 %, 
partly reflecting a 30% reduction in remittances, and the strong contraction of industrial 
output by around 10 % following the drop in metals prices. A recovery above 3% is 
foreseen for 2010 although it will be fragile and will depend on the developments of the  
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Russian economy. Data from the first five months of 2010 confirm the upward trend in 
GDP, which rose by 7.2% year-on-year. The sectors leading the recovery are services 
and industry, the latter benefitting from rising metals prices and government support 
measures.  
Unemployment increased modestly in 2009 (to 6.9%, from 6.3% in 2008). The poverty 
ratio rose from 21.7% in 2008 to 24.6% in the third quarter of 2009. To mitigate these 
effects, the authorities increased average pensions and family benefits over the past two 
years, while improving the targeting of social benefits. Going forward, in order to protect 
the poor, the authorities aim to maintain social spending in 2010 broadly at the nominal 
level of 2009. 
At the outbreak of the crisis, the authorities acted rapidly, adopting appropriate measures 
to mitigate the effects of the sharp downfall in output. In March 2009, they reverted to a 
fully floating exchange rate regime, allowing a de facto devaluation of the Armenian 
dram by around 22% against the euro and the USD. This step helped to improve 
competitiveness without threatening financial stability as the negative effects of the 
devaluation were largely absorbed. At the same time, they channelled donors' funds to 
on-lending activities to SME's and to specific sectors of the economy.  
Average inflation in 2009 remained relatively low at around 3.5 % on the back of weak 
demand. However, end-period inflation was already 6.5% in December 2009 and it 
remained worrisome in the first four months of 2010 (reaching 6.8% in April year-on-
year) as a result of the rise in international prices of raw materials and food products, the 
oligopolistic structure of import trade, and the peak up in aggregate demand. The central 
bank raised the refinancing rate from 5% (the rate that has been in place since September 
2009) to 7.25% in May 2010 in several steps. However, movements in the refinancing 
rate have only had a limited impact, as the domestic money market is not sufficiently 
developed and the dollarization rate is high (around 70%). 
After the March 2009 devaluation, the central bank committed to a free floating 
exchange rate regime. However, the exchange rate market is small and highly volatile, 
and the central bank often undertakes foreign exchange interventions to limit exchange 
rate volatility. Even though the exchange reserves floor target set by the IMF programme 
was comfortably met in December 2009, the central bank lost around USD 435 million in 
foreign exchange  operations between September 2009 and April 2010. Apart from 
reducing short-term exchange rate volatility, central bank's interventions were aimed also 
at countering emerging inflation pressures by avoiding exchange rate depreciation.   
Altogether, since the beginning of 2010 the Armenian dram has depreciated by 3.9% 
against USD and has appreciated by around 16.6% against the euro (data as of 
03/06/2010). Although foreign reserves in March 2010 were at sufficient levels (around 
USD 1.8 billion), a need for reserve built-up cannot be excluded in the near future as the 
current account deficit is expected to remain high.  
Fiscal revenues decreased by 15% in 2009 while current expenditure (made up mainly of 
social spending and public wages) increased despite cuts in non-essential expenditures. 
As a result, the fiscal deficit rose markedly to 7.8% of GDP in 2009 (from 1.2% of GDP 
in 2008). Since growth is unlikely to resume strongly in the next two years, the fiscal 
deficit is forecasted to reach 5% of GDP in 2010 and 4% of GDP in 2011. The bulk of 
the budget financing needs will continue to be covered by international donors. Already 
in 2009, foreign financing allowed capital spending (mainly badly needed infrastructure 
investments) to increase by 21%. As a result, public debt is expected to increase from  
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16% of GDP at the end of 2008 to 50.8 % of GDP in 2010, with the external component 
reaching 43 % of GDP. While this debt level is still considered to be manageable,  the 
increase in foreign exchange-denominated public debt is increasing significantly the 
exposure of the budget to an exchange rate shock.  
External trade turnover contracted in 2009 by 27% (in dollar terms). Export revenue 
contracted by 34 %, influenced by the drop in prices of metallurgical products, while 
imports contracted to a lesser extent (by around 26%). Remittances dropped by 30%. As 
a result, despite the significant weakening of the Armenian dram and the deep recession, 
the trade deficit failed to adjust and widened from 22.3% of GDP in 2008 to 23.9% of 
GDP in 2009 while the current account deficit widened from 11.5% of GDP in 2008 to 
13.8  % of GDP in 2009. These developments were exacerbated by the lack of 
competitiveness of the Armenian economy. FDI fell to 5.5% of GDP in 2009 from 7.7% 
of GDP in 2008. The situation in the external sector was somewhat better in the first 
quarter of 2010: export value increased by 160% (compared with Q1/2009) mainly as a 
result of the upward movement in prices of metals and food products (which constitute 
key export products of the Armenian economy) while import value increased to a lesser 
extent by 123%. Remittances in Q1/2010 have been stabilised at the same levels as 
Q1/2009. Despite these positive trends, pressures in the balance of payments will remain 
as the current account deficit for 2010 is projected to reach around 13% of GDP and is 
expected to remain high over the medium term. 
The banking sector in Armenia is relatively small (banking assets represent around 35% 
of GDP) but well capitalised and deposit-funded (the capital adequacy ratio was at 28% 
in March 2010). Despite some modest increase in non-performing loans, stress tests 
show that, under all scenarios except for extreme credit shocks, the capital adequacy 
ratio would decline by no more than 4% for the system as a whole. Nevertheless, there is, 
as noted, a high dollarization ratio (above 70%) and a large currency mismatch between 
assets (mainly foreign currency denominated) and liabilities. [Lending rates on credit in 
domestic currency continue to be high (about 18%).] In 2009 and in the first half of 
2010, banks were reluctant to lend in local currency and borrowers were reluctant to 
borrow in USD as they considered another devaluation of the Armenian currency likely 
in the near future. Consequently, credit expansion decelerated to 15% in 2009 from 48% 
in 2008. This deceleration concerned mostly consumer credit and loans to construction 
companies. The authorities are in the process of taking additional measures to narrow the 
currency mismatch between assets and liabilities and to reduce high dollarization of 
deposits. 
4.3.  Structural reforms 
Despite the progress achieved in recent years, Armenia will need to pursue its economic 
reform efforts. Particular focus should be put on the improvement of the business and 
investment environment in order to strengthen the competitiveness of the economy and 
on reversing the recent negative trends in poverty and unemployment. With respect to 
poverty, while the targeting of social assistance programs has improved, coverage 
remains limited. The authorities are in the process of updating the Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Paper, which will provide analytical underpinnings for the growth and poverty 
reduction strategy. In that context, the efficiency and targeting of education and health 
spending will also be important given the efforts for fiscal consolidation in the coming 
years.  
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Economic competition in the internal market needs strengthening as still large market 
segments are dominated by few market players. Although, the legislative and 
institutional framework in this area is well developed in Armenia (revised recently in 
2007), the implementation of the relevant laws on competition issues remains weak 
largely due to weaknesses in enforcement powers and institutional capacity. 
Despite some improvements in recent years, given the structural weakness in the current 
account and the high volatility in the balance of payments, business environment needs 
to be significantly improved to narrow external imbalances. Improvements in 
infrastructure, customs administration, standardisation and certification are important to 
strengthen competitiveness in a land-locked country with high transportation costs and 
limited transportation routes. Progress in many of the trade-related reforms will be also 
critical for the launching of negotiations for a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade 
Agreement with the EU, which is expected to improve the access of the Armenian 
exports to the European markets. 
Finally, improving internal audit and procurement systems, combating tax evasion and 
corruption, streamlining tax administration procedures and establishing a comprehensive 
debt management strategy are necessary reforms given the public debt accumulation and 
the fiscal consolidation challenges that Armenia will face in the coming years. 
4.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In March 2009, the Armenian authorities reached an agreement with the IMF on a Stand-
By Arrangement totalling about USD 810 million, while securing additional funding 
from other multilateral and bilateral donors (including a USD 500 million loan from 
Russia) to meet the increasing fiscal and external financing needs. On 28 June 2010, the 
IMF Executive Board approved a new programme, under the Extended Fund Facility and 
the concessional Extended Credit Facility. Under the new programme, which replaced 
the Stand-By Arrangement, Armenia will have access to about USD 392 million (290% 
of quota) in a three year period. 
In November 2009, the European Union Council of Ministers decided to provide MFA to 
Armenia amounting to EUR  100 million, part of which will be in grants 
(EUR 35 million). Additional EU funds are expected to be made available to Armenia in 
the form of budget support grants under the European Neighbourhood and Partnership 
Instrument (ENPI)
5. 
The Commission is currently discussing with the Armenian authorities the economic 
policy and financial conditions of the operation. The policy conditions proposed by the 
Commission would support the authorities' reform efforts and are intended to be 
implemented before the end of 2010. They will focus in principle on the areas of public 
finance management, taxation, debt management and pension reform. Depending on 
progress with the discussions and the developments of Armenia's financing needs, the 
full amount of the first tranche of the assistance (a grant of EUR 17.5 million and a loan 
of EUR 30 million) could be released to the budget in September 2010 while the second 
                                                 
5 In 2010, the ENPI budget support disbursements are in the order of EUR 10 million (under ENPI annual 
action programmes for 2007 and 2008. DG AIDCO is also preparing a new General Budget Support 
programme amounting to EUR 22 million (incl. EUR 1 million for technical assistance). The 
disbursements under this programme are likely to start in early 2011.  
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tranche of the assistance (a grant of EUR 17.5 million and a loan of EUR 35 million) is 
foreseen to be released early 2011 subject to the compliance to the economic conditions 
attached.  
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ARMENIA - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation 
Prices are largely free but there are fixed unclear monopolistic conditions in a number of sectors of the 
economy. 
2. Trade regime 
Armenia is a WTO member since 2003. The tariff structure is simple, all tariffs are bound and the applied 
average tariff is 2.7%. Customs procedures have improved but customs clearance remains slow and 
sometimes non-transparent due to the use of 'reference' values in breach of WTO rules. Problems remain 
regarding technical barriers to trade and in the sanitary and phyto-sanitary areas. Taxation of tobacco and 
beverages is still in breach to WTO rules. In 2009, Armenia qualified for the EU GSP+. EU is committed 
to launching DCFTA negotiations with Armenia once Armenia satisfies a number of pre-conditions.  
3. Exchange rate regime 
After the March 2009 devaluation of the Armenian dram, the central bank announced the adoption of a 
free floating exchange rate regime. However, the exchange rate market is small and highly volatile, and the 
central bank often undertakes foreign exchange interventions to limit exchange rate volatility.  
4. Foreign direct investment 
Armenia has a liberal trade and investment regime and there have been a number of improvements in the 
business climate and regulations in recent years in areas such as access to credit, registration of enterprises 
and the inspection of goods. The representatives of the business community who met an EU delegation in 
June 2010 expressed overall satisfaction with the investment climate.  However, for a small land-locked 
economy with structural external imbalances more efforts should be made in areas of customs clearance, 
tax administration and anti-monopoly policies. FDI fell to 5.5% of GDP in 2009 from 7.7% of GDP in 
2008. 
5. Monetary policy 
The central bank of Armenia follows an inflation targeting regime to conduct the monetary policy. 
However, the impact of monetary policy decisions on the economy is limited because domestic money 
market is not sufficiently developed and the rate of dollarization of deposits is close to 70%. 
6. Public finances and taxation 
Before the economic crisis, Armenia had a good track record in preserving fiscal discipline. While public 
expenditure management is strong, there is considerable room for improve several areas of public financial 
management such as internal financial control.  The authorities are moving to address this issue. They also 
reverted to the Medium-Term Expenditure framework abandoned during the economic crisis. Tax and 
customs administration also need to be strengthened to meet the fiscal consolidation challenges ahead. 
7. Financial sector 
The banking sector in Armenia is relatively small (banking assets represent around 35% of GDP) but well 
capitalised and deposit-funded (capital adequacy ratio was 28% in March 2010). It consists mainly of 
private banks. The dollarization ratio is high (above 70%) and there is an important currency mismatch 
between assets (mainly foreign currency denominated) and liabilities. The central bank of Armenia is 
taking measures to strengthen prudential regulation and address these and other issues. 
8. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
During the 1990's and early 2000's most of the small- and medium-sized enterprises were privatised. Also, 
the electric power distribution system was privatised in 2005. Plans to privatise some remaining smaller 
enterprises seem to have been delayed as a result of the economic crisis.  
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5. GEORGIA 
5.1.  Executive summary 
The global financial and economic crisis strongly affected Georgia and thus further 
exacerbated the economic downturn caused by the military conflict with Russia that 
occurred in August 2008. In 2009, real GDP contracted by 3.9%. As a result of the 
economic slowdown average inflation fell dramatically from 10% in 2008 to 1.7% in 
2009. The country's external imbalances were somewhat reduced in 2009. The large 
current account deficit decreased from around 23% of GDP in 2008 to 12% of GDP in 
2009. The strong rebalancing was driven by the trade balance adjustment as imports 
declined faster than exports thus reducing the trade deficit from around 30% of GDP in 
2008 to 23%. 2009 was also marked by a strong decline of capital inflows: in comparison 
to 2008, worker remittances declined by more than 20%, while FDI inflows more than 
halved. 
Both the country's fiscal position and its public debt position deteriorated in 2009. The 
budget deficit reached 9.2% of GDP. The widening of the general government deficit 
was mainly due to a contraction in fiscal revenue caused by the recession. It was 
financed through the external financial assistance of the International Financial 
Institutions bilateral partners and by issuing domestic Treasury bills. External public debt 
increased to 32% of GDP in 2009. Higher external borrowing provided funding for 
public infrastructure rehabilitation and social spending projects. 
In September 2008, the IMF approved an 18-month Stand-By Arrangement for Georgia, 
worth USD 750 million. In 2009, Georgia drew an amount equivalent to 
USD 410 million. During the third review, approved by the IMF Board in August 2009, 
the SBA was extended until June 2011 and the financing package increased by about 
USD 424 million, bringing the whole SBA programme to USD 1.17 billion. 
The EU Council Decision of 30 November 2009 provided MFA to Georgia amounting to 
EUR 46 million, in grants. This assistance is part of a comprehensive EU package of up 
to EUR 500 million to support Georgia's economic recovery in the aftermath of the 
August 2008 armed conflict with Russia.  This EU assistance was pledged at an 
international donors conference in November 2008, which raised commitments by the 
international community totalling USD 4.5 billion.  
The Commission disbursed the first tranche of the MFA of EUR 23 million in two parts 
in December 2009 and in early January 2010. 
5.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
The global financial and economic crisis strongly affected Georgia and thus further 
exacerbated the economic downturn caused by the military conflict with Russia that 
occurred in August 2008. In the first half of 2009, real GDP dropped by 8.5% continuing 
the contraction that started in the third quarter of 2008. The economic contraction was 
driven by the decline in domestic demand caused by a tightening of bank credit, a fall in 
remittances and in foreign direct investment inflows, which subsequently led to a decline 
in output and consumption. Economic sectors especially hit have been manufacturing 
and construction. The first signs of economic stabilisation appeared in the third quarter of 
2009. In 2009, real GDP contacted by 3.9%. As a result of the economic slowdown and  
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the decline in international commodity prices, average inflation fell dramatically from 
10% in 2008 to 1.7% in 2009.  
The country's external imbalances declined somewhat in 2009. The large current account 
deficit decreased from around 23% of GDP in 2008 to 12% of GDP in 2009. This strong 
rebalancing was driven by the trade balance: exports and imports of goods and services 
declined by 16% and 30%, respectively, thus reducing the trade deficit from around 30% 
of GDP in 2008 to 23% of GDP. 2009 was also marked by a strong decline of capital 
inflows: in comparison to 2008, worker remittances declined by more than 20% to 
USD 0.5 billion, while FDI inflows more than halved going from USD 1.5 billion to 
USD 0.8 billion. 
Both the country's fiscal position and its public debt position deteriorated in 2009. The 
budget deficit reached 9.2% of GDP. The widening of the general government deficit 
was mainly due to a contraction in fiscal revenue caused by the recession. It was 
financed through the external financial assistance of the International Financial 
Institutions and the bilateral partners and by issuing domestic Treasury bills. As far as 
public debt is concerned, several years of strong growth and prudent debt management in 
early 2000s had significantly reduced Georgia’s public debt and thus the country's 
external vulnerability. Public and publicly guaranteed external debt fell from 50% of 
GDP in 2000 to about 18% of GDP in 2007. Yet, this declining trend stopped in 2008: 
external public debt increased to around 21% of GDP in 2008 and to 32% of GDP in 
2009. Higher external borrowing and international donors provided funding for public 
infrastructure rehabilitation and social spending projects. 
As regards monetary and exchange rate policy, central bank legislation was amended in 
spring 2008 to make price stability the core objective of the National Bank of Georgia. 
This was to be achieved by introducing an inflation-targeting regime. However, from 
August 2008 the central bank resumed its interventions on the foreign exchange market 
to limit the depreciation of the lari. In early November 2008, under pressure from the 
markets, the authorities allowed the exchange rate to depreciate against the US dollar by 
around 17%. Since March 2009, the authorities have allowed for greater exchange rate 
flexibility. The central bank held regular foreign currency auctions to prevent the 
exchange rate from fluctuating too much but the practice of almost daily interventions 
has been abandoned. 
The global financial crisis had adverse repercussions on the country's financial 
intermediation. Before the crisis, Georgia's financial sector was growing at a fast pace: 
domestic credit expanded from around 27% to 31% between 2006 and 2008. However, 
since late 2008, household deposits and bank lending have fallen considerably. Trust in 
the lari declined in 2009 with the share of domestic deposits held in foreign currency 
increased to 83%, from 64% in 2008.  
The central bank took a number of counter-cyclical measures to increase liquidity and 
restore confidence in the banking sector by lowering reserve requirements and reducing 
the refinancing rate. However, monetary policy instruments have only had a limited 
impact due to the central role of the foreign currency in domestic financial transactions: 
the Georgian banking sector is highly "dollarized". Thus, rather than the central bank's 
refinancing rate, it is the domestic interest rate on the USD that has influenced the 
economic activity. In 2009, the high domestic lending rate of 23% restrained domestic 
lending and thus hampered economic recovery. Key challenges for the national monetary 
authorities are to rebuild trust in the national currency, develop monetary policy tools  
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and revive credit lending to the private sector in order to stimulate economic activity, 
while keeping inflation in check. 
Poverty is widespread in Georgia, with 30% of the population living on less than USD 2 
a day and more than half of the population living below the national poverty line. 
According to the IMF Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper, 52% of the population lived in 
poverty and 15% in extreme poverty in 2003. As in all transition countries, economic 
inequality has increased. While the top quintile of the population accounts for 30.6% of 
overall consumption, the bottom quintile's share of consumption is only 1.9%. Several 
factors have contributed to the high poverty and increasing inequality. Among them are a 
high unemployment rate of around 16.5% of the labour force and low real wages. 
A targeted social assistance programme introduced in 2006 covers around 16% of the 
population, but the level of assistance is low. Regional inequality is also significant, rural 
areas being the most disadvantaged. Gender inequality is considered to be relatively low, 
but is rising due to a lack of appropriate child care provisions.  
5.3.  Structural reforms 
Since the 2003 Rose Revolution, Georgia has made significant progress in a number of 
legal and regulatory reforms. The tax system has been simplified and public finance 
management brought closer into line with international practices. Customs regime has 
been liberalised, while important anti-corruption measures have been taken and the 
regulatory business environment has substantially improved. However, in several areas, 
notably trade-related areas like protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights, 
competition, food safety and technical barriers to trade, Georgia's progress in 
approximation with the EU and international laws and standards remained limited. The 
economic crisis that started with the August 2008 war and was further fuelled by the 
global economic slowdown meant that the pace of legislative and regulatory policy 
initiatives slowed down in late 2008 - early 2009 as more urgent issues, such as 
accommodating the immediate needs of internally displaced persons were high on the 
government's policy agenda. However reforms efforts revived in the second half of 2009, 
with a number of new initiatives being put on the table. 
One policy field that has been at the heart of government's reform efforts has been public 
finance management. Among the important milestones of these reforms have been: 
changing the budget process and format to meet internationals standards; introduction of 
a Single Treasury Account in 2005; and the reform of accounting and budget 
classification rules in 2008. Recent initiatives include the new budget code that unifies 
all the existing legislation on the budget process, and the new public procurement law, 
which brings public procurement practice into line with international standards. Some 
progress has also been achieved in reforming internal and external audit. 
In the area of the financial sector reform, policy initiatives put forward in 2009 included 
the new Organic Law on the National Bank of Georgia. The new Law merged the 
Financial Supervision Agency with the central bank of Georgia. This law, effective from 
1 December 2009, allowed the central bank to improve its macro-prudential oversight by 
supervising the whole of the country's financial sector. It also established price stability 
over the medium term as a key responsibility of the central bank.  
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5.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In September 2008, to improve the country's balance of payments position and to 
contribute to a more stable macroeconomic policy framework, the IMF approved an 18-
month Stand-By Arrangement for Georgia worth USD 750 million. The programme was 
frontloaded and enabled Georgia to draw USD 250 million from the Fund in the first 
instalment. In 2009, Georgia drew an amount equivalent to USD 410 million. At the third 
review, approved by the IMF Board in August 2009, the Stand-By Arrangement was 
extended until June 2011 and the financing package increased by about USD 424 million 
bringing the whole SBA programme to USD 1.17 billion.  
The EU Council Decision of 30 November 2009 approved the provision of MFA to 
Georgia amounting to EUR 46 million, in grants. This assistance is part of a 
comprehensive EU package of up to EUR 500 million to support Georgia's economic 
recovery in the aftermath of the August 2008 armed conflict with Russia. This EU 
assistance is in turn part of a larger support package pledged by the international donor 
community at the Donor Conference which amounted to USD 4.5 billion, including USD 
1 billion from the USA, USD 200 million from Japan, USD 173 million from the EU 
member states and USD 2.4 billion from the Multilateral Financial Institutions.  The 
MFA supported the Stand-By Arrangement agreed by the Georgian government with the 
IMF.  
The Union's MFA contributed to covering Georgia's external financing needs in 2009-
2010. By providing the MFA, the EU, together with the International Financial 
Institutions and bilateral donors, supported the authorities’ efforts to improve the balance 
of payments situation, improve debt sustainability and address social hardship caused by 
the military conflict and the global economic and financial crisis. 
The Commission disbursed the first tranche of the assistance of EUR 23 million in 
December 2009 and January 2010. The MFA conditionality, which is consistent with the 
IMF programme conditionality, has two elements: (i) the IMF Stand-By Arrangement 
programme must remain on-track; (ii) satisfactory progress must be made within a 
number of reforms in the field of public finance management. Reforms leading to a more 
transparent, coherent and accountable public finance management system have been a 
high priority for the Government of Georgia and the EU has been supporting these 
reforms.   
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GEORGIA - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation  
Prices are largely free. 
2. Trade regime 
Georgia has a liberal trade regime. Import tariffs have been abolished on around 90% of products. In 
September 2006, the number of tariff bands on imported goods was reduced from 16 to three (0%, 5%, 
and 12%). The maximum tariff of 12% is applied to those agricultural products and building materials 
which compete with domestic goods. The average weighted tariff is estimated to be 1.5%. Non-tariff 
barriers allowed for environmental, security and health reasons. There are no quantitative restrictions 
on imports and exports. However, in 2009, Georgia continued to have discriminatory excise taxation 
on certain imported tobacco products and its applied import tariffs on spirits were above the levels 
specified in Georgia's WTO schedules. Some of the excise taxes were equalised from January 2010. 
Georgia has been member of the WTO since 2000. EU-Georgia bilateral trade relations are regulated 
by the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, in force since 1999. Since December 2005, Georgia 
has benefited from the tariff preferences under the GSP+. On 10 May 2010, the EU Council approved 
the mandate for the negotiations of the Association Agreement between the EU and Georgia, including 
the establishment of a DCFTA, once the necessary conditions are met. 
3. Exchange regime 
Floating exchange rate of the lari with limited official intervention by the National Bank of Georgia. 
There are no restrictions on current international transactions, in conformity with Article VIII of the 
IMF’s Articles of Agreement. 
4. Foreign Direct Investment 
Virtually all FDI related flows, including the repatriation of capital and profits, have been liberalised. 
Net inflows of FDI amounted to around 7% of GDP in 2009.  
5. Monetary policy 
The central bank's main policy objective is the price stability, to be pursued through a formal inflation 
targeting regime.  
6. Public Finances and taxation 
General government expenditure made up 37.1% of GDP in 2008. A new liberal tax code came into 
force on 1 January 2005. Over the period of 2004-08, the number of taxes was reduced from 21 to 6. In 
2008, the corporate profit tax was reduced from 20% to 15%, while the income and social taxes were 
merged into one income tax of 25%. The tax code was further amended in 2009 in order to further 
decrease the tax burden and facilitate economic development. Improvements were introduced in the 
VAT deduction system and the e-filing system for tax returns has been further implemented. Georgia 
has double taxation agreements with 26 countries, including 19 EU Member States. Three new double 
taxation treaties were signed in 2009. 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring   
There has been significant progress in privatisation and enterprise restructuring. Private sector amounts 
to 75% of GDP, while cumulative privatisation revenues reached around 42% of GDP. 
8. Financial Sector  
The majority of Georgia's commercial banks are foreign owned. In the summer of 2009, the share of 
non-performing loans increased to more than 18%. Since the beginning of the global crisis, the EBRD 
had to step in to recapitalise two systemically important banks. The banking sector is highly 
'dollarized'. In 2009, the share of domestic deposits held in foreign currency increased to 83%, from 
64% in 2008. 
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6. UKRAINE 
6.1.  Executive summary 
Ukraine entered into a severe recession in 2009, with real GDP contracting in excess of 
15%. Although the trade deficit fell sharply in 2009, stemming from a strong contraction 
in imports, Ukraine’s overall balance of payments was negative. To finance the shortfall, 
Ukraine depleted its international reserves and resorted to borrowing from the IMF. 
However, in October 2009 the IMF programme went off track in light of additional 
government spending plans in the context of the presidential election campaign.  
An IMF Stand-By Arrangement amounting to USD 16.5 billion was approved by the 
IMF Board in early November 2008. After the disbursement of three tranches amounting 
overall to USD 10.6 billion, the IMF programme was put on hold in November 2009. 
After several rounds of negotiations interrupted by the presidential elections and the 
formation of the new government in spring 2010, a staff-level agreement on a new Stand-
By Arrangement of USD 14.9 billion for 2.5 years was announced on 2 July 2010. 
Against the backdrop of the severe contraction in the Ukrainian economy, foreign 
exchange reserve depletion, pressure on the currency and deteriorating public finances, 
the Ukrainian authorities requested crisis-related assistance from the EU of USD 
5 billion in February 2009. The European Commission proposed to make available an 
additional EUR 500m in macro-financial assistance to Ukraine in October 2009. The 
Council adopted the Decision on 29 June and the Parliament signed the decision on 7 
July 2010. This assistance is to be combined with the EUR  110  million that remain 
undisbursed from the MFA approved by the Council in 2002. The next round of 
negotiations on MFA policy conditionality is expected to take place in July 2010. 
6.2.  Macroeconomic performance 
In the EU neighbourhood, Ukraine was among the countries worst hit by the 
international economic and financial crisis. In 2009, GDP contracted by 15.1% in real 
terms, with growth having already slowed to 1.9% in 2008 after an average increase of 
nearly 8% over the preceding five years.  
On the production side, the sharp drop in GDP over 2009 was primarily driven by a real 
contraction of 25.6% in manufacturing, the most important sector in the Ukrainian 
economy, accounting for one-fifth of total production. Wholesale and retail trade, the 
second-largest sector (15.9% of total output), experienced a 15.6% drop, while 
construction and energy production also registered double-digit contractions.  
These sectoral developments are mirrored on the demand side. Gross fixed capital 
formation shrank by 46.2% in real terms and detracted 12.2 percentage points from real 
GDP growth, reflecting companies’ unwillingness to invest in the wake of a rapidly 
deteriorating demand outlook, poor order books and dwindling profitability. In addition, 
Ukrainian banks experienced a reduction in the availability of external financing; both 
state-owned and private commercial banks had to be recapitalised, at a cost to the 
government of around 2.8% of GDP, financed primarily through domestic bond issuance, 
which was one of several factors in the increase in public debt to 35% of GDP in 2009 
(from 12% in 2007 and 20% in 2008). Banks passed the credit squeeze on to the real 
economy in the form of tighter lending conditions, which in turn contributed to the 
retrenchment in investment and in household consumption. The latter contracted by  
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14.2% in real terms in 2009, accounting for 8.7 percentage points of the recorded decline 
in real GDP. 
In contrast to the pre-crisis years – when economic growth in Ukraine was domestic-
demand-led, while net exports tended to detract from growth – 2009 saw a large positive 
contribution (9.2 percentage points) from the external sector. This stemmed from the 
38.6% drop in imports, which outweighed the (also rapid) contraction in exports of 
25.6%, a reaction to world recession.  
This sharp adjustment in the real economy, with its sudden drop of imports, triggered an 
improvement in the current account, the deficit of which narrowed from 7.7% of GDP in 
2008 to 1.5% in 2009. The driving factor in this correction was the trade balance (in the 
case of Ukraine, goods trade dwarfs the flows recorded in the services, income and 
current transfers balances).  
However, the improvement in the current account over 2009 was more than offset by the 
deterioration in the financial and capital account. In particular, Ukrainian banks 
experienced difficulties in obtaining external financing and were faced with a situation in 
which loan repayments to foreign creditors exceeded drawings of fresh loans. Moreover, 
foreign residents sold more Ukrainian bonds than they bought. As a result of this capital 
flight and despite the improvement in the current account, Ukraine’s overall balance of 
payments was negative. The country financed this shortfall in two main ways: through 
the use of the central bank’s international reserves and through borrowing from the IMF. 
The depletion of Ukraine’s official reserves already started in the final quarter of 2008 
when the international financial crisis escalated. They fell by over one-third from 
USD 36.8 billion at the end of September 2008 to just USD 23.7 billion at end-April 
2010. Reserves recovered only mildly during the remainder of 2009, ending the year at 
USD 25.5 billion. This drop in foreign currency reserves weakened Ukraine’s external 
liquidity position significantly and, in November 2008, prompted the National Bank of 
Ukraine to allow the hryvnia to depreciate from its long-standing exchange rate of close 
to UAH 5 per US dollar. Between November 2008 and December 2009, the hryvnia lost 
nearly 40% of its value in US dollar terms, which stabilised around UAH 8 per US dollar 
in the final quarter of 2009. The sharp depreciation of the domestic currency led to 
higher prices for imported goods and services, in particular gas (hydrocarbons make up 
approximately one-third of Ukraine’s import bill). As a consequence, despite the deep 
recession, Ukraine’s consumer price inflation remained high, at 15.9% in 2009 (annual 
average). 
The second source of financing to cover the balance of payments shortfall was credit 
from the IMF. The Fund started its latest lending operation in Ukraine in November 
2008, paying out around USD 4.5 billion to the NBU in the first tranche. The second 
tranche, worth around USD 3 billion, was disbursed in May 2009 in roughly equal parts 
to the central bank and, as direct budget support, to the government. The third tranche 
(USD 3.5 billion, paid out in August 2009) was exclusively used for budget support.  
 
6.3.  Structural reforms 
Structural reform was hampered over 2009 by the deep economic crisis. In addition, the 
presidential election of January-February 2010 was looming over the political  
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environment in the latter part of 2009, giving additional incentives for expansionary 
fiscal measures and exacerbating rivalries at the highest political level. Indeed, the IMF 
suspended its programme before the disbursement of the fourth and final tranche, 
scheduled for November 2009, due in particular to the projected budgetary impact of the 
so-called social standards bill, which was adopted by the Ukrainian Parliament in 
October 2009 and signed into law by President Yushchenko the following month 
(contrary to IMF advice). The bill foresees gradual increases in the official minimum 
subsistence level (which is used to determine various social benefits) and the minimum 
wage (which is used, among others, to set public sector pay). 
The beginning of the 2009 was overshadowed by a renewed gas dispute between Ukraine 
and Russia, which resulted in a significant increase in the price for Ukraine’s gas imports 
from its eastern neighbour. Thus, while official figures for the consolidated government 
budget deficit show only a relatively modest widening from 1.2% of GDP in 2008 to 
3.8% of GDP in 2009 (due not so much to active counter-cyclical policies as to a fall in 
government revenues), the 2009 budget balance including the deficit incurred by 
Naftogaz, the state-owned gas company, amounted to around 9% of GDP. This reflects a 
significant subsidisation of domestic gas prices in Ukraine to levels that frequently do 
not even cover the price at which Naftogaz itself buys the gas, not to mention its own 
operating costs and the investment needs of the transmission system. While in July 2009 
the Ukrainian government committed to a comprehensive reform programme in the 
energy sector, notably in agreements with the EU and the international financial 
institutions, the politically sensitive issue of domestic gas price increases was not 
addressed in the subsequent implementation period. 
Elsewhere, according to the World Bank’s Doing Business study, which aims to measure 
business regulation, Ukraine’s commercial environment improved only marginally over 
the course of 2009. The country now ranks 142nd in the world, compared with Rank 146 
a year earlier. Particularly problematic areas include the bureaucratic burden on 
businesses associated with paying taxes and with obtaining construction permits. 
6.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
An IMF Stand-By Arrangement amounting to USD 16.5 billion was approved by the 
IMF Board in early November 2008. After the disbursement of three tranches amounting 
overall to USD 10.6 billion, the IMF programme was put on hold in November 2009. 
After several rounds of negotiations interrupted by the presidential elections and the 
formation of the new government in spring 2010, a staff-level agreement on a new Stand-
By Arrangement for a 2.5-year programme amounting to USD 14.9 billion was 
announced on 2 July 2010. 
Against a backdrop of the severe contraction in the Ukrainian economy, foreign 
exchange reserve depletion, pressure on the currency and deteriorating public finances, 
Ukraine requested crisis-related assistance from the EU of USD 5bn in February 2009. In 
October 2009 the European Commission proposed to make available EUR 500 million in 
MFA to Ukraine. The Council adopted the Decision on 29 June while the Parliament is 
expected to sign it on 7 July 2010. Thus, together with the Council decision from 2002 
on MFA amounting to up to EUR 110 million, which had not been disbursed in previous 
years, a total of up to EUR 610 million is made available for MFA to Ukraine in 2010-
2011. 
In parallel, efforts by the Commission to prepare the implementation of the MFA 
included the assignment of PriceWaterhouseCoopers to conduct a new Operational  
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Assessment of administrative procedures and financial circuits of public organisations 
involved in the management of MFA in Ukraine. The assessment was carried out in 
October 2009. The general conclusion of the consultants is that the framework for sound 
financial management is effective despite several weaknesses detected during this 
mission, namely the absence of an efficient external audit function, a lack of 
transparency in public procurement and difficulties in the financial management of state-
owned enterprises.  These shortcomings will be taken into account in the design of the 
conditionality of the approved EU MFA.  
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UKRAINE - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM 
1. Price liberalisation   
Most prices are free. Regulated prices prevail for some utilities, notably gas, as well as in some other 
areas.  
2. Trade liberalisation   
Ukraine joined the WTO in May 2008. This has generally helped to limit crisis-related protectionist 
pressures, although the authorities resorted to temporary import duty surcharges on cars and 
refrigerators during 2009. Negotiations on a DCFTA with the EU are on-going. 
3. Exchange rate regime   
Ukraine’s central bank manages the level of the hryvnia against the US dollar. In late 2008, due to 
the crisis, the official exchange rate of close to UAH5:USD was abandoned. Since late 2009, the 
hryvnia has been held close to UAH8:USD. 
There are only few restrictions on current international transactions, in conformity with Article VIII 
of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. During the crisis, in response to pressures on the currency 
markets, the central bank introduced a number of foreign exchange controls. 
4. Foreign direct investment   
FDI related flows are largely liberalised but a registration of foreign investment is required. FDI 
inflows reached a peak of USD 10.9 billion or 6.0% of GDP in 2008 (due mainly to healthy inflows 
during the first three quarters). However, in 2009 they more than halved to USD 4.8 billion or 4.1% 
of GDP.  
5. Monetary policy   
The National Bank of Ukraine is responsible for controlling domestic inflation and managing the 
currency, with the latter effectively taking precedence.  
6. Public finances   
General government expenditure made up 47.3% of GDP in 2008 (last available data). Two thirds of 
Ukraine’s government expenditure goes towards wages and social transfers. While consolidated 
government deficit stood at a relatively moderate 3.8% of GDP in 2009, the figure is much higher 
(around 9% of GDP) if the deficit incurred by Naftogaz, the state-owned gas company, is included. 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring   
There has been substantial progress in privatisation and enterprise restructuring.  Cumulatuve 
privatisation revenues constituted 15.5% of GDP. While in the mid-2000s, private sector represented 
65% of GDP, this share somewhat decreased to 60% in 2009. The privatisation of strategic assets 
(notably the gas transmission system) is prohibited by law. 
8. Financial sector reform   
Before the crisis, Ukraine had two state-owned banks: Ochadbank, a savings bank, and 
Ukreximbank, a bank specialised in export-import financing. In July 2009, the number of state 
owned banks increased to five as the state became majority owner in Kiev Bank, Rodovit and 
Ukrgazbank. Out of 186 operating banks, a total of 51 financial institutions have foreign capital, 
including 17 with 100% foreign capital. Several banks from the EU countries are major players in 
Ukraine: Raiffeisen Bank Aval, BNP Paribas, Crédit Agricole, Swedbank, Unicredito, 
Commerzbank and Hungarian OTP. The overall foreign capital stake in the Ukrainian bank system 
has decreased from about 39% to 35%. 
The share of non-performing loans rose from 3% in early 2008 to 10% in mid-2009.  
37 
MEDITERRANEAN COUNTRIES 
7. LEBANON 
7.1.  Executive summary 
Mediterranean Countries taking part in the European Neighbourhood Policy are eligible 
for MFA under the Genval Criteria. Lebanon is the first country of this group benefiting 
from MFA since the balance of payments loan granted in 1994 to Algeria (Decision 
1994/933/EC). 
In 2009 the Lebanese economy weathered the global crisis relatively well, aided by 
capital inflows and strong growth of foreign deposits in the banking sector. This helped 
underpin fairly strong real GDP growth and enabled the government to finance the 
deficit. The fiscal situation, however, remained very vulnerable. Implementation of the 
ambitious programme of structural reforms concluded in the aftermath of the Paris 
agreements stalled as a consequence of the political stalemate, which paralysed progress 
in legislative activity in many fields. With a new coalition government finally formed in 
November 2009, prospects for legislative progress have improved, but the political 
context remains difficult. The follow-up to the original IMF Emergency Post-Conflict 
Assistance (EPCA), equivalent to SDR 25.375 million, was successfully completed in 
June 2009, but no follow-up programme has been agreed with the authorities. 
Since January 2007, Lebanon and the EU have been implementing a European 
Neighbourhood Policy Action Plan. The third progress report on the Action Plan 
implementation was issued by the Commission in May 2010 and concluded that little 
progress had been made in implementing the economic reform agenda. 
In December 2007, the Council adopted a decision on a MFA to Lebanon amounting to 
EUR 80 million – a combination of medium-term loans (EUR 50 million) and grants 
(EUR 30 million), to be disbursed in two tranches. The first tranche of grants and loans 
were disbursed in December 2008 and June 2009 respectively. At the end of 2009, the 
availability period of the assistance was extended to 21 December 2010. The lack of 
progress with implementing the MFA conditions has thwarted disbursement of the 
second tranche under the assistance programme. 
7.2.  Macroeconomic developments 
The latest economic indicators show a quite robust performance of the Lebanese 
economy in spite of the global financial crisis. Real GDP growth is estimated at 5.5% on 
average in 2009, from 8.5% in 2008. Leading indicators show ongoing expansion of 
economic activity. This partly reflects the fact that the financial sector proved remarkably 
resilient to the global crisis and to the politically uncertain environment, with a 
government of national unity only formed towards the end of 2009. The high number of 
visitors from abroad around the elections also boosted domestic expenditure. For several 
industries the negative impact of the global financial crisis was increasingly felt towards 
end-2008, via several transmission channels. Trade volumes decelerated from the 
beginning of 2009 onwards, mirroring the slowdown in major trading partners, notably 
Arab countries and the countries in the European Union, which account for around 50 
and 17 percent of Lebanese exports respectively. Persistent high interest rate spreads to 
international benchmarks kept interest rates on domestic bank loans up. From the second 
half of 2008 onwards, remittance inflows fell back in view of the slowdown in countries 
where Lebanese expatriates had been working.   
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But several other factors acted in support of the economy. Inflationary pressures abated 
sharply from the latter part of 2008 onwards, as commodity and global trade prices fell. 
Consumer price inflation as measured by the CPI fell from more than 10% in 2008 to 
around 1% in 2009. In addition, despite a clear negative impact of the crisis on tradable 
industries (exports contracted by 18%) the Lebanese banking system has so far been 
quite resilient. Lebanese banks have long-standing experience in operating in a strained 
economic and political environment, have had high liquidity buffers, limited exposure to 
structured products under long-standing prudential directives by the central bank, and 
had not borrowed heavily on international markets – if only because of Lebanon's 
impaired investor status. Relatively high deposit interest rates helped attract funding 
inflows in the aftermath of the global financial crisis, partly reflecting regional portfolio 
shifts in a relative flight to yield and certainty. Share prices also recovered from the 
trough in spring 2009, in line with global trends. Moreover, remittances inflows picked 
up again on the back of the rebound in regional and global growth. 
Thus, Lebanon registered substantial capital inflows. Deposit inflows were sustained 
despite a continued fall in domestic interest rates and were partly diverted into real estate 
but did not translate into an acceleration in domestic credit growth to the private sector. 
The surge in financial inflows helped push foreign currency reserves to record levels, 
further bolstering the credibility of the exchange rate peg. In 2009, foreign currency 
reserves increased by 50.3 percent. Deposit growth helped domestic banks (which are the 
largest creditor group to the government) absorb high-yielding government bonds, which 
partly compensated for the lack of lending opportunities. The government borrowed 
beyond its needs, as reflected by the growing gap between the gross and net public debts. 
Ample liquidity enabled extending state borrowing to longer maturities in the yield curve 
(5-year T-bills in Lebanese pounds and 5 and 15-year eurobond issues that were finally 
launched early December 2009, yielding 5.875 and 7% respectively).  
On the back of moderating growth, the current account deficit broadly stabilised in 2009, 
at around 11% of GDP. The total external debt ratio further declined to 187% of GDP in 
2009, continuing the moderate downward trend witnessed in previous years. The 
elevated external debt ratio goes hand in hand with a high public deficit and debt. 
Despite buoyant fiscal revenue (up by around 20%) backed by strong economic activity, 
the government budget deficit (including grants) is expected to have broadly stabilised at 
around 10% of GDP in 2009, partly reflecting substantial increases in pension outlays 
and other government expenses. Total public expenditure increased by around 15%, of 
which is a large part is going to service the public debt. The relatively high interest rate 
spread which helped support capital inflows, is thus weighing on the government budget. 
International support did help alleviate the pressure on public finances. This included the 
first tranche of grants and loans (EUR 15 and EUR 25 million respectively) under the EU 
MFA facility. 
In 2010, real GDP growth is expected to slow down to slightly above 2%, in response to 
the fading out of several factors that supported growth in 2009, such as financial 
portfolio shifts and the strong surge in tourist receipts Despite the overall resilience of 
the Lebanese economy to global headwinds in 2009, the economic situation remains 
vulnerable on several counts. Apart from political risks and the general uncertainty on 
the strength of the global upswing, these relate to the high public and external debt, the 
reliance on just a few sectors to provide the bulk of growth, uncertainty about the 
persistence of foreign inflows in a situation where banks continue to have maturity 
mismatches, and possible inflation risks also in view of rising commodity prices.   
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7.3.  Structural reforms 
Implementation of the reform agenda outlined in the Paris III donors' conference 
programme stalled against a background of deep political divisions and consequent 
paralysis of legislative activity in the run-up to the June 2009 parliamentary elections and 
during the protracted subsequent negotiations on forming a new government.  
Still mainly as a reflection of the long-lasting political stalemate, no meaningful progress 
was made on key reforms such as changing the heavily subsidised electricity subsidy 
system and passing the draft laws on WTO-related issues, pension reform, capital market 
reform and public procurement. Large privatisation projects, notably for mobile 
telephony and electricity supply, have been put on ice, reflecting ongoing uncertainty 
about market conditions. A 25% stake in the national air carrier MEA, held by the central 
bank, was announced to be floated in 2010 thus delaying the time path for full 
privatisation. 
More generally, many impediments to a conducive business climate remain unresolved. 
Hence, the ranking of Lebanon according to several business climate measures remained 
poor in comparison with regional peers, many of which made progress in recent years. 
The central bank progressed in improving operating procedures in financial services and 
adopting International Financial Reporting Standards. In view of the large weight of the 
financial sector in the Lebanese economy, international agreements on actions to 
improve oversight and reduce systemic risk in the global financial sector will have an 
impact in the years to come. Against this background, the Banque du Liban and IMF 
agreed to have a new Financial Stability Assessment in 2010. This would be valuable to 
identify vulnerabilities in the Lebanese financial system and to benchmark against new 
standards of oversight that are being implemented internationally. The high interest rates 
charged by commercial banks on domestic loans reflect the high spreads against 
international interest rate benchmarks that support deposit and reserve inflows. Spreads 
are in part mirroring risk premia and heavy government borrowing. However, the 
ensuing high interest rates and conservative lending policies hinder lending to domestic 
industries, in particular small and medium-sized enterprises. 
With respect to public finance management, progress with improving budgetary planning 
and control has been limited. This concerns measures aimed at improving budget 
formulation and execution as well as plans to improve cash management and implement 
a single treasury account. The 2010 budget that was approved in April 2010 includes 
some provisions on fiscal accountability, but this does not imply a multi-annual fiscal 
framework. 
With the new government in place, it is crucial that the authorities proceed with reviving 
the stalled reform agenda. This with a view to make growth in the country less dependant 
on a few industries only, such as finance, and to develop growth potential in other 
sectors. Despite relatively favourable macroeconomic developments in the last year, the 
fiscal deficit and public debt remain high and progress with fiscal consolidation to reduce 
the hefty burden of public debt service remains a key priority to ensure sustainability. 
7.4.  Implementation of macro-financial assistance 
In 2008, the Commission started the implementation of the Council Decision 
2007/860/EC providing macro-financial assistance of EUR 80 million in the form of a 
combination of a medium-term loan and grant of EUR 50 and 30 million respectively.  
40 
The assistance complements support from the Bretton Woods institutions, bilateral 
donors (including EU Member States and Arab countries), and other EU assistance 
provided under the ENPI and in the form of EIB loans. MFA is conditional, in particular, 
on progress in the implementation of IMF arrangements.  
The EU MFA aims primarily at supporting the authorities' effort of fiscal consolidation. 
Thus, the specific reform measures targeted by the programme focus on public finance 
management and on two specific sector policies of particular importance for fiscal 
adjustment and debt reduction, namely the power sector and the social sector. Agreement 
on the conditions to be attached to the disbursement of the assistance was reached in the 
course of 2008. Subsequently, the EUR 15 million first tranche of the grant was 
disbursed end-December 2008. The first tranche of a 5-year loan of EUR 25 million was 
disbursed on 4 June 2009.  
Due to the difficult political situation in the run-up to elections, progress with fulfilling 
the conditions was very limited in 2009. Against this background, in December 2009, the 
Commission extended the availability period of the second tranche of the assistance 
programme by one year, which will now expire on 21 December 2010. Disbursement of 
the second tranche is subject to the fulfilment of the agreed policy conditionality.  One 
important element of conditionality is the existence of an ongoing IMF programme. In 
November 2008, the IMF Board approved a second Emergency Post-Conflict Assistance 
(EPCA II) package of SDR 25.375 million. The EPCA II programme expired at the end 
of June 2009, with the quantitative targets (focusing on an increase in foreign currency 
reserves and on targeting a reduction in the primary fiscal balance) comfortably met. 
However, key non-quantitative targets were not met, notably the introduction of a single 
Treasury account; the reform of electricity tariffs; and the privatisation of mobile phone 
networks. No further IMF programmes have been launched. 
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LEBANON - SUMMARY STATUS OF ECONOMIC REFORM  
1. Price liberalisation 
Most prices are free, but the government subsidises the price of wheat. 
2. Trade liberalisation 
Liberal international trade policy, but protectionist measures are occasionally introduced. 
Lebanon is a founding member of GATT but it withdrew in 1949. It is now negotiating the 
accession to WTO.  
3. Exchange regime 
Fixed exchange rate (peg to the USD). No restrictions on current international transactions 
in conformity with Article VIII of the IMF’s Articles of Agreement. Lebanon has also 
achieved substantial capital account convertibility. 
4. Foreign direct investment 
Unlimited repatriation of capital and profits and no limitations on holding foreign currency 
bank accounts. Legislation is overall adequate and an investment development authority 
exists but enforcement of contracts is sometimes problematic in the absence of commercial 
courts and independent judiciary.  
5. Monetary policy 
The Banque du Liban uses a wide range of monetary policy instruments to maintain 
financial stability and provide liquidity to the banking sector. It also occasionally provides 
financing to the government (on a temporary basis). The exchange rate peg is regarded as a 
key factor in maintaining monetary stability 
6. Public finance 
The high public debt ratio and high interest rates at which the government is borrowing 
remain issues of concern, also given the quite shallow tax base, which is skewed towards 
indirect taxes and provides exemptions for the banking sector, notably as regards taxing 
foreign deposits. Public finance management reform focuses on budget formulation and 
execution and medium-term planning. There has been little progress in recent years. Key 
issues, such as the Treasury Single Account law, are still pending before Parliament. 
7. Privatisation and enterprise restructuring 
The structural reform programme focuses on privatisation, improvement of business 
climate, privatisations, and opening of markets, but progress has been stalled due to the 
political situation. Important privatisations, for instance of mobile telephony licenses and 
the electricity company, have been postponed. 
8. Financial sector reform 
Lebanon has a sophisticated and developed financial sector, based on domestic private 
banks, which proved resilient to shocks despite vulnerabilities.  
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Annex 1A - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY DATES OF COUNCIL DECISIONS
Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2009 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
( Loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
Mar. 1992 190
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
( Loan) Jan. 1993 80
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
( Loan) Mar. 1992 140
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
( Loan) Apr. 1992 185
Israel   (1) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
( Loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
( Loan) Aug. 1994 150
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
( Grant) Aug. 1993 35
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
( Loan) Aug .1996 40
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
( Loans); of which: (Suspended)
    Estonia 40 Mar. 1993 20 20 20
    Latvia 80 Mar. 1993 40 40 40
    Lithuania 100 Jul. 1993 50 75 25
Aug. 1995 25
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
( Loan)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 Dec. 1994 25 45
( Loan) Aug. 1995 20
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
( Loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
( Grant) Oct. 1996 20
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
( Loan) (Suspended)
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Jul. 1996 130
( Loan) (Cancelled)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
( Loan)
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
( Loan) (Suspended)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
( Loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
( Loan)
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
( Loan) Feb. 1998 15
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
( Loan) Dec. 1998 125
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (2) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 294,5 80,5
( Loan and grant); of which:
28.3.00 00/244/EC
modified by 
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
 
   Armenia 58 Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 58 0
   (Loan and grant) Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
June 2004 (grant) 5,5
Dec 2005 ( grant) 1,5
   Georgia 175 Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 141,5 33,5
   (Loan and grant) Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan 95 Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 95
   (Loan and grant) Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb. 2003 (grant) 7
May 2005 (grant) 7
Oct 2007 (grant) 7
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
( Loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (Cancelled)
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
( Loan)
Bosnia I  (3) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
( Loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
( Loan) Sep. 2000 60
fYRoM II (4) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
( Loan and grant) 18 Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/900/EC Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec. 2003 (grant) 8
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
( Loan) July 2003 (loan) 50
Kosovo I (5) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant ) Aug. 2000 15
Montenegro (5) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 72 0
(Grant ) Dec. 2000 13
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
( Loan) 19.12.02 02/1006/EC (Cancelled)
Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant)  Dec. 2002 15
Serbia and Montenegro (ex FRY) I (6) 16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 225 345
(Loan and grant) Oct. 2001 35
10.12.01 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 40
Aug 2002 45
Ukraine III   12.07.02 02/639/EC
Modification Decision 98/592/EC
Ukraine IV 12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
( Loan)
Serbia and Montenegro (ex FRY) II (7) 05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
(Loan and grant) Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
Bosnia II (8) 05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 25
(Loan and grant) Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
modified by
modified by
modified by
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements disbursed
 
Moldova IV 19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
(Grant)
Serbia and Montenegro 25.11.03 03/825/EC 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 10 20
(ex FRY) II (7)
Modification Decision 02/882/EC
(grant)
Albania IV (9) 29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov 2005 (grant) 32 5
(Loan and grant) March 2006 ( loan) 9
July 2006 (grant) 13
Bosnia II (8) 7/12/2004 04/861/EC Dec 2004 (loan) 10 35
Modification Decision 02/883/EC Jun 2005 (grant) 15
(grant and loan) Feb 2006 (loan) 10
Serbia and Montenegro (ex FRY) II (7) 07.12.2004 04/862/EC April 2005 (loan) 15 40
Modification Decision 02/882/EC Dec 2005 (grant) 25
(Grant and loan)
Georgia II         24.01.06 06/41/EC 33,5 August 2006 (grant) 11 22 11,5
(Grant) Dec 2006 (grant) 11
Kosovo  30.11.06 06/880/EC 50 50
(Grant)
Moldova 16.04.07 07/259/EC 45 Oct 2007 (grant) 20 45
(Grant) Jun 2008 (grant) 10
Dec 2008 ( grant) 15
Lebanon (10) 10.12.07 07/860/EC 80 Dec 2008 (grant)  15 40 40
(Loan and grant) Jun 2009 ( loan) 25
Georgia 30.11.09 09/889/EC 46 Dec 2009 (grant) 15.3 15,3 30,7
(Grant)
Armenia (11) 30.11.09 09/890/EC 100 100
( Loan and grant)
Bosnia-Herzegovina  30.11.09 09/891/EC 100 100
(Loan)
Serbia  30.11.09 09/892/EC 200 200
(Loan)
Ukraine  29.06.10 10/  /EC 500 500
(Loan)
TOTAL 7350 5350,3 2144,7
                                                            
(1)
(2)
countries
(3)
(4) Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million
(5) Exceptional financial assistance
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(8) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(9) Includes a loan principal amount of € 9million and grants of € 16 million
(10) Includes a loan principal amount of € 50 million and grants of € 30 million
(11) Includes a loan principal amount of € 65 million and grants of € 35 million
Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 20 million and grants of up to € 40 million
Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed 
Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants
Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of € 160 million and grants of € 27.5 million in the form of interest subsidies 
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Status of effective disbursements as of end-December 2009 (in millions of euro) 
Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
A. EU Accession countries
Baltics 23.11.92 92/542/EC 220 135 85
( loans) (Suspended)
of which :
    Estonia 40 Mar. 1993 20 20 20
    Latvia 80 Mar. 1993 40 40 40
    Lithuania 100 Jul. 1993 50 75 25
Aug. 1995 25
Bulgaria I  24.06.91 91/311/EC 290 Aug. 1991 150 290
( loan) Mar. 1992 140
Bulgaria II 19.10.92 92/511/EC 110 Dec. 1994 70 110
( loan) Aug .1996 40
Bulgaria III 22.07.97 97/472/EC 250 Feb. 1998 125 250
( loan) Dec. 1998 125
Bulgaria IV 08.11.99 99/731/EC 100 Dec. 1999 40 100
( loan) Sep. 2000 60
Czech and Slovak Federal Republic 25.02.91 91/106/EC 375 Mar. 1991 185 375
( loan) Mar. 1992 190
Hungary I 22.02.90 90/83/EC 870 Apr. 1990 350 610 260
(Structural adjustment loan) Feb. 1991 260 ( Suspended)
Hungary II 24.06.91 91/310/EC 180 Aug. 1991 100 180
( loan) Jan. 1993 80
Romania I 22.07.91 91/384/EC 375 Jan. 1992 190 375
( loan) Apr. 1992 185
Romania II 27.11.92 92/551/EC 80 Feb. 1993 80 80
( loan)
Romania III 20.06.94 94/369/EC 125 Nov. 1995 55 125
( loan) Sep. 1997 40
Dec. 1997 30
Romania  IV 08.11.99 99/732/EC 200 Jun. 2000 100 150 50
( loan) July 2003 50
Slovakia 22.12.94 94/939/EC 130 Cancelled 130
( loan) (Jul. 1996) Cancelled
------- ------- -------
TOTAL A 3305 2780 525
Annex 1B - COMMUNITY MACRO-FINANCIAL AND EXCEPTIONAL FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE
 TO THIRD COUNTRIES BY REGION
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements
B. Western Balkans
Albania I 28.09.92 92/482/EC 70 Dec. 1992 35 70
( grant) Aug. 1993 35
Albania II 28.11.94 94/773/EC 35 Jun. 1995 15 35
( grant) Oct. 1996 20
Albania III 22.04.99 99/282/EC 20 20
( loan) ( Cancelled)
Bosnia I  (1) 10.05.99 99/325/EC 60 Dec. 1999 (grant) 15 60
( loan and grant) Dec. 1999 (loan) 10
10.12.01 01/899/EC Dec. 2000 (grant) 10
Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
Dec. 2001 (grant) 15
fYRoM I 22.07.97 97/471/EC 40 Sep. 1997 25 40
( loan) Feb. 1998 15
fYRoM II (2) 08.11.99 99/733/EC 80 Dec. 2000 (grant) 20 98
( loan and grant) Dec. 2000 (loan) 10
10.12.2001 01/900/EC 18 Dec. 2001 (loan) 12
Dec. 2001 (grant) 10
May 2003 (grant) 10
June 2003 (loan) 10
Dec. 2003 (loan) 18
Dec.) 2003 (grant) 8
Kosovo I (3) 19.02.00 00/140/EC 35 Mar. 2000 20 35
(Grant budgetary support) Aug. 2000 15
Kosovo II (3) 27.06.01 01/511/EC 30 Sep. 2001 15 30
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2002 15
Montenegro (3) 22.05.00 00/355/EC 20 Aug. 2000 7 20
(Grant budgetary support) Dec. 2000 13
16.07.01 01/549/EC 345 Oct. 2001 (grant) 35 345
modified by Oct. 2001 (loan) 225
10.12.2001 01/901/EC Jan. 2002 (grant) 40
Aug.2002 (grant) 45
05.11.02 02/882/EC 130 Dec. 2002 (grant) 30 105 25
Fev. 2003 (loan) 10
Aug. 2003 (grant) 35
Aug. 2003 (loan) 30
25.11.03 03/825/EC (7) 70 Dec 2004 (grant) 10 50 20
07.12.04 04/862/EC
April  2005 (loan) 15
Dec 2005 (grant) 25
05.11.02 02/883/EC 60 Fev. 2003 (grant) 15 60
Dec. 2003 (grant) 10
Dec 2004 (loan) 10
07.12.04 04/861/EC June 2005 (grant) 15
Feb 2006 (loan) 10
29.04.04 04/580/EC 25 Nov  2005 (grant) 3 25
Mar 2006 (loan) 9
Jul 2006 (grant) 13
Kosovo   30.11.06 06/880/EC 50 50
Bosnia-Herzegoviona (9) 30.11.09 09/891/EC 100 100
Serbia (9) 30.11.09 09/892/EC 200 200
TOTAL B 1388 973 415
------- ------- -------
(1)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million.
(2)  Includes a loan principal amount of up to € 50 million and grants of up to € 48 million.
(3) Exceptional financial assistance.
(4)  Includes a loan principal amount of € 225 million and grants of € 120 million.
(5) Includes a loan principal amount of € 55 million and grants of € 75 million
(6) Includes a loan principal amount of € 20 million and grants of € 40 million
(7) Includes a loan principal amount of € 25 million and grants of € 45 million
(8) Includes a loan principal amount of € 9 million and grants of € 16 million
(9) Assistance includes only loans
modified by
Bosnia II (6)
( loan and grant)
modified by
(loan and grant)
modified by
modified by
Serbia and Montenegro I 
(ex FRY) (4)
Serbia and Montenegro II 
( ex FRY) (5)
(loan and grant)
Albania IV (8)
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements  
C. New Independent States (NIS)
Armenia, Georgia and Tajikistan (9) 17.11.97 97/787/EC 375 294,5 80,5
(Structural adjustment loans and grants) modified by
of which 28.3.00 00/244/EC
   Armenia (58) Dec. 1998 (loan) 28 (58) 0
Dec. 1998 (grant) 8
Dec.  1999 (grant) 4
Feb. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Dec. 2002 (grant) 5,5
Jun 2004( grant) 5,5
Dec 2005(grant) 1,5
   Georgia (175) Jul. 1998 (loan) 110 (141,5) (33,5)
Aug. 1998 (grant) 10
Sep. 1999 (grant) 9
Dec. 2001 (grant) 6
Dec. 2004 (grant) 6,5
   Tajikistan (95) Mar. 2001 (loan) 60 (95)
Mar. 2001 (grant) 7
Dec. 2001 (grant) 7
Feb 2003 (grant) 7
May 2005 (grant) 7
Oct 2006 (grant) 7
Belarus 10.04.95 95/132/EC 55 Dec. 1995 30 30 25
( loan) (Suspended)
Moldova I 13.06.94 94/346/EC 45 déc-94 25 45
( loan) Aug. 1995 20
Moldova II 25.03.96 96/242/EC 15 Dec. 1996 15 15
( loan)
Moldova III 10.07.00 00/452/EC 15 15
( loan) 19.12.02 02/1006 EC (cancelled)
19.12.02 02/1006/EC 15 15
(15)
Ukraine I 22.12.94 94/940/EC 85 Dec. 1995 85 85
( loan)
Ukraine II 23.10.95 95/442/EC 200 Aug. 1996 50 200
( loan) Oct. 1996 50
Sep. 1997 100
Ukraine III 15.10.98 98/592/EC 150 Jul. 1999 58 58 92
( loan) 12.07.02 02/639/EC (cancelled)
12.07.02 02/639/EC 110 110
(15)
Georgia II         21.01.06       06/41/EC 33,5 Aug 2006 11 22 11,5
Dec 2006 11
Moldova        16.04.07      07/259/EC 45      Oct 2007 20 45
Jun 2008 10
Dec 2008 15
Georgia 30.11.09 09/889/EC 46 Dec 2009 15.3 15,3 30,7
Armenia (11) 30.11.09 09/890/EC 100 Dec 2009 100
Ukraine 29.06.10 10/  /EC 500 500
TOTAL C 2289,5 809,8 1479,7
Ukraine IV
Moldova IV
( grant)
( loan) 
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Authorisations Disbursements
Country  Date of Reference of Maximum Dates of Amounts of Totals Undisbursed
Council Decision Council Decision amount disbursements disbursements  
D. Mediterranean countries
Israel   (10) 22.07.91 91/408/EC 187,5 Mar. 1992 187,5 187,5
(Structural adjustment soft loan)
Algeria I 23.09.91 91/510/EC 400 Jan. 1992 250 400
( loan) Aug. 1994 150
Algeria II 22.12.94 94/938/EC 200 Nov. 1995 100 100 100
( loan) (Suspended)
Lebanon (12) 10.12.07      07/860/EC 80          Dec 2008 15 40
Dec 2009 25
------- ------- -------
TOTAL D 867,5 727,5 140
TOTAL A+B+C+D 7350 5290,3 2059,7
9)   Exceptional financial assistance, which includes a ceiling of euro 245 million for the loans and a ceiling of euro 130 million for the grants
        
beneficiary countries
(10)    Assistance to Israel includes a loan principal amount of ECU 160 million and grants of ECU 27,5 million in the form of interesr subsidies.
(11) Includes a loan principal amount of € 65 million and grants of € 35 million
(12) Includes a loan principal amount of € 50 million and grants of € 30 million
Out of the global amount of euro 375 million, maximum amounts of euro 58 million, euro 175 million and euro 95 million were actually agreed with the
 